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RÉSUMÉ
L’avénement des réseaux sociaux, tel que Facebook, MySpace et LinkedIn, a fourni une
plateforme permettant aux individus de rester facilement connectés avec leurs amis, leurs
familles ou encore leurs collègues tout en les encourageant activement à partager leurs
données personnelles à travers le réseau. Avec la richesse des activités disponibles sur
un réseau social, la quantité et la variété des informations personnelles partagées sont
considérables. De plus, de part leur nature numérique, ces informations peuvent être
facilement copiées, modifiées ou divulguées sans le consentement explicite de leur pro-
priétaire. Ainsi, l’information personnelle révélée par les réseaux sociaux peut affecter
de manière concrète la vie de leurs utilisateurs avec des risques pour leur vie privée allant
d’un simple embarras à la ruine complète de leur réputation, en passant par l’usurpation
d’identité. Malheureusement, la plupart des utilisateurs ne sont pas conscients de ces
risques et les outils mis en place par les réseaux sociaux actuels ne sont pas suffisants
pour protéger efficacement la vie privée de leurs utilisateurs. En outre, même si un utili-
sateur peut contrôler l’accès à son propre profil, il ne peut pas contrôler ce que les autres
révèlent à son sujet. En effet, les “amis” d’un utilisateur sur un réseau social peuvent
parfois révéler plus d’information à son propos que celui-ci ne le souhaiterait.
Le respect de la vie privée est un droit fondamental pour chaque individu. Nous pré-
sentons dans cette thèse une approche qui vise à accroître la prise de conscience des
utilisateurs des risques par rapport à leur vie privée et à maintenir la souveraineté sur
leurs données lorsqu’ils utilisent un réseau social. La première contribution de cette thèse
réside dans la classification des risques multiples ainsi que les atteintes à la vie privée
des utilisateurs d’un réseau social. Nous introduisons ensuite un cadre formel pour le
respect de la vie privée dans les réseaux sociaux ainsi que le concept de politique de
vie privée (UPP). Celle-ci définie par l’utilisateur offre une manière simple et flexible
de spécifier et communiquer leur attentes en terme de respect de la vie privée à d’autres
utilisateurs, tiers parties ainsi qu’au fournisseur du réseau social. Par ailleurs, nous dé-
finissons une taxonomie (possiblement non-exhaustive) des critères qu’un réseau social
peut intégrer dans sa conception pour améliorer le respect de la vie privée. En introdui-
iv
sant le concept de réseau social respectueux de la vie privée (PSNS), nous proposons
Privacy Watch, un réseau social respectueux de la vie privée qui combine les concepts
de provenance et d’imputabilité afin d’aider les utilisateurs à maintenir la souveraineté
sur leurs données personnelles. Finalement, nous décrivons et comparons les différentes
propositions de réseaux sociaux respectueux de la vie privée qui ont émergé récemment.
Nous classifions aussi ces différentes approches au regard des critères de respect de la
vie privée introduits dans cette thèse.
Mots clés: Vie privée, réseaux sociaux, imputabilité, filigrane, cryptage, contrôle
d’accès.
ABSTRACT
The rise of Social Networking Sites (SNS), such as Facebook, Myspace, and LinkedIn
has provided a platform for individuals to easily stay in touch with friends, family and
colleagues and actively encourage their users to share personal information. With the
wealth of activities available on SNS, the amount and variety of personal information
shared is considerable and diverse. Additionally, due to its digital nature, this informa-
tion can be easily copied, modified and disclosed without the explicit consent of their
owner. Personal information disclosed from SNS could affect users’ life, with privacy
risks ranging from simple embarrassment to ruining their reputation, or even identity
theft. Unfortunately, many users are not fully aware of the danger of divulging their per-
sonal information and the current privacy solutions are not flexible and thorough enough
to protect user data. Furthermore, even though users of SNS can control access to their
own profile, they cannot control what others may reveal about them. Friends can some-
times be untrustworthy and disclose more information about the user than they should.
Considering that privacy is a fundamental right for every individual, in this thesis,
we present an approach that increases privacy awareness of the users and maintains
the sovereignty of their data when using SNS. The first contribution of this thesis is the
classification of multiple types of risks as well as user expectations regarding privacy in
SNS. Afterwards, we introduce the Privacy Framework for SNS and the concept of User
Privacy Policy (UPP) to offer users an easy and flexible way to specify and communicate
their privacy concerns to other users, third parties and SNS provider. Additionally, we
define a taxonomy (possibly non-exhaustive) of privacy criteria that can enhance the
user privacy if they are integrated within the design of a SNS and introduce the concept
of a Privacy-enhanced SNS (PSNS). Furthermore, we present also Privacy Watch, a
theoretical proposal of a PSNS platform that combines the concept of provenance and
accountability to help SNS users maintain sovereignty over their personal data. Finally,
we survey and compare several privacy-enhanced SNS that were recently proposed that
try to integrate some privacy features directly into the design of the system. We also
classify these different approaches with respect to the privacy criteria developed.
vi
Keywords: Privacy, social networking sites, accountability, watermarking, en-
cryption, access control.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Recent advances in Information Technologies have brought important changes to
the nature of communication and socialization. Indeed, throughout the last few years,
blogs, forums, instant messaging, podcasts, online photo albums have bloomed all over
the Internet. Nowadays, all these media are gathered together in Social Networking
Sites (SNS). Starting at simple websites that allowed users to connect and interact with
content posted by other users, SNS have developed rapidly by integrating new features
as technology evolves. With many different activities available to the users, the amount
and variety of data gathered by the SNS is especially great and diverse. On average, in
one year, a user will share 415 pieces of content on Facebook, spend an average of about
23 minutes a day on Twitter, tweeting a total of around 15,795 tweets, check in 563 times
on Foursquare and upload 196 hours of video on YouTube [77].
The rapid growth of SNS in recent years indicates that they are now a mainstream
communication technology for many people. The people who use SNS see them as a
fun and easy leisure activity. However, the reputation of these SNS has been tarnished
by a number of incidents in news media, such as the massive worldwide spam campaign
in Quechup [65]. For instance, the incident of the mobile application Girls Around Me
highlight how much information an SNS knows about us. The application collected data
from Foursquare 1, a location-based SNS for mobile devices, and used it to show local
bars where women had checked in before matching this information with their Facebook
profile. While the application only uses data that is publicly available on Foursquare and
Facebook, a blogger reported that he was able to use Girls Around Me to find one person
he found attractive, and was then able to discover her personal information such as full
name, age, birthday, current location (based on a recent Foursquare check-in), marital
status, school, political views, her favourite drink (based on Facebook photos), recent
travels as well as her relatives’ full names [79].
1. http://foursquare.com
2Although SNS provide some mechanisms (privacy settings, block users...) to protect
users against these risks, it seems that there is still much to be desired. Consider for
instance the following scenario. On Saturday evening, Alice went to a party at Carol’s
place and got dizzy through the abuse of grape juice. She had some pictures taken
and then posted them on her Facebook account. Unfortunately, as her profile is opened
to the public by default, everybody can have access to these pictures. Bob, another
guest of Carol’s party, took one of her party pictures, and modified it by attaching some
“inappropriate” comments directly on the picture. After that, he reposted the “new”
picture on his own Facebook account without bothering to tag or tell this to Alice (who
he might only have met for the first time at this party). Afterwards, this picture is re-
shared and exchanged many times between friends. As a result, the existence of this
photo may damage Alice’s reputation and credibility.
This scenario illustrates the following privacy challenges:
1. How can Alice find out about the existence of the “new” picture as well as the
inappropriate comments attached to it?
2. How can Alice discover who is the owner of the “new” picture in order to exert
her right to be forgotten and to ask Bob to remove it?
3. How can she remove all the traces of this unflattering picture and the inappropriate
comments before her boss gets to see them?
4. And finally, how can Alice safely share her personal pictures with friends without
fear that they would use these pictures for other purposes?
Let us consider the case in which Bob is just an ignorant user who shared the picture
as a joke. If contacted by Alice, Bob can easily remove the picture as well as his com-
ments without needing much persuasion. However, if another malicious Facebook user
has already copied this picture, removed all ownership metadata and claimed he is the
“real” owner, then on most of the existing SNS, Alice has no way to force him to remove
this picture if he does not want to.
Alice in the above scenario may not be representative of the whole population of
SNS users but through her privacy challenges, we can detect multiple privacy problems
3within the current SNS. The top and foremost privacy problem is that SNS users are not
fully aware of the danger of divulging their personal information. Although privacy and
safety issues are the subject of much discussion in the media, these issues still did not
emerge as ‘top of mind’ for most SNS users. They are seemingly unwilling to consider
that there could be a more serious side to their activities on SNS. Even if they want to
protect their privacy, with too much data and too many friends, it is very difficult for
users to control who can see what in their profile pages. The second problem is that
privacy tools in SNS are not flexible enough to protect user data. Most SNS only allow
user to make public (available for everyone) or private (available only for Friends) the
whole profile but not every part of it. The third problem is that when users of SNS can
control access to their own profile, they cannot control what others reveal about them.
There is also the possibility of information being passed on without one’s consent. For
instance, a user can upload an embarrassing photo of a friend; he could even tag the
photo directly to his friend’s profile.
Considering that privacy is a fundamental right for every individual, in this thesis,
we present an approach that increases privacy awareness of the users and maintains
the sovereignty of their data when using SNS. As a result, the users should be better
equipped to defend against the underlaying risks of SNS, and that is the main objective
of our project.
The first contribution of this thesis is the classification of multiple types of risks as
well as user expectations regarding privacy in SNS. Specifically, we analyze and group
privacy risks into three categories: Security risks (e.g., identity theft, phishing, cyber
predator...), Reputation and Credibility risks (e.g., employees being fired due to social
media slip-ups [70]) and Profiling risks (e.g., spam, profiling...) (see Section 3.1). We
also elicit privacy requirements of SNS users based on the finding of various surveys
(Section 3.2) and our own preliminary study (Section 4.1).
Afterwards, we introduce the Privacy Framework for SNS and the concept of User
Privacy Policy (UPP) to offer users an easy and flexible way to specify and communi-
cate their privacy concerns to other users, third parties and SNS provider. In this Privacy
Framework, the user data is divided into categories based on its privacy risk and its im-
4portance to the users. We also adapt the four privacy levels first proposed in our previous
work to the context of SNS [2] . The User Privacy Policy is designed based on this
framework and offers users an easy and flexible way to specify and then communicate
their privacy concerns to other users, third parties and SNS service provider.
Additionally, we define a taxonomy (possibly non-exhaustive) of privacy criteria that
can enhance the user privacy if they are integrated within the design of a SNS and intro-
duce the concept of a Privacy-enhanced SNS (PSNS) (Section 4.4).
Furthermore, we present also Privacy Watch, a theoretical proposal of a PSNS plat-
form that combines the concept of provenance and accountability to help SNS users
maintain sovereignty over their personal data (Chapter 5). Privacy Watch is based on
the hybrid architecture in which a centralized server (the SNS server) is responsible
for storing the personal information of the user (but possibly encrypted). Users of Pri-
vacy Watch install Client Privacy Manager (CPM) on their computer (for instance as
a Firefox or Chrome extension) that has the responsibility of helping them to enforce
their sovereignty on their personal information. Privacy Watch also relies on an auxil-
iary channel such as an independent mail server to store and exchange privacy policies
and encryption keys among users. Moreover, Privacy Watch creates privacy awareness
among SNS users with the Privacy Advisor module (Section 5.2.1). The Privacy Advi-
sor guides users when they determine their privacy levels based on three factors: main
objective for using SNS, user background, and user privacy concerns. Based on the se-
lected privacy levels, the Policy Builder lets users create their own UPP in a simple and
easy-to-understand manner. While the UPP allows users to express their privacy con-
cerns, this policy still needs to be enforced. In order to enforce the UPP, we present the
Privacy Controller (server-side and client-side) and the Accountability Manager. While
Privacy Controller detects and prevents unauthorized access to user data, the Account-
ability Manager inserts ownership information into user data (especially pictures and
videos) to protect users against unauthorized uses of their information.
Finally, we survey and compare several privacy-enhanced SNS that were recently
proposed that try to integrate some privacy features directly into the design of the system
(Chapter 6). We also classify these different approaches with respect to the privacy
5criteria developed in Section 4.4.
This document is organized as follows: we present an overview of SNS in chapter
2. In chapter 3 we examine different types of risks as well as user expectations regard-
ing privacy in SNS. Then we describe our preliminary study to examine the usage and
privacy concerns of SNS users and introduce a Privacy Framework tailored for SNS in
chapter 4. Privacy Watch, our proposed implementation for a Privacy-enhanced SNS, is
introduced in chapter 5. Finally, we present a comparison survey of solutions that have
been proposed to enhance the privacy of users of SNS in chapter 6 and conclude the
document in chapter 7.
CHAPTER 2
SOCIAL NETWORKING SITES
In this chapter, we introduce the concept of Social Networking Site (SNS). More pre-
cisely, in the first subsection we give a definition as well as a brief history of SNS while
in the second subsection we review some well-known and popular SNS and highlight
the main functionalities of a SNS.
2.1 Definition and History
In the past few years SNS have become some of the most popular websites world-
wide. In order to better understand SNS, we must consult its definition as well as its
history.
2.1.1 Definition
The term “social networking sites” originates from “social network”, which repre-
sents relationships and flows between people, groups, organizations, animals, computers
or other information/knowledge processing entities [11]. At the most basic level, SNS
consists of a representation of each user (often a profile). The profile page acts as the
homepage of the user and may include personal information such as photos, date of birth,
gender, religion, favourite music, books quotes, hobbies . . . In addition, users can often
customize the appearance of their profile page with widgets and applications. Further-
more, users are able to create a network of contacts with whom they can connect that
are sometimes called “Friends”. Users can view and traverse their list of Friends and
those made by others within the SNS [19]. These Friends may be real friends or offline
acquaintances, but also persons that are barely known from users and even persons that
they have only met online. Therefore, the term “Friend” as it used by a SNS such as
Facebook (see Figure 2.1) is often misleading and differs from its traditional meaning
in the offline world. In this thesis, we use the term “Friend” in its broader sense as
7anyone who has been invited by another user and accepted the invitation to become his
“Friend” [19]. Moreover, SNS usually provide a mechanism for users to “communicate
Figure 2.1: Friends in Facebook
and share” with their Friends, such as the possibility to add comments on the profiles
of their Friends, instant messaging capacities or integrated mail accounts. Additionally,
SNS also integrate other networking features such as the possibility to share picture and
videos or the use of groups and forums. Another definition states that a SNS is simply a
website that provides a virtual community for people interested in a particular subject or
just to “hang out” together [47]. Finally, Boyd and Ellison [19] provide a more formal
definition of SNS saying that they are “web-based services that allow individuals to:
1. construct a public (or semi-public) profile within a bounded system,
2. articulate a list of other users with whom they share a connection, and
3. view and traverse their list of connections and those made by others within the
system.”
8However, this definition falls short of describing newly emerging SNS such as Twitter 1
or resource-sharing websites with social networking components such as Youtube 2 and
Picasa 3. Moreover, it does not encompass the privacy and security concerns that appear
in an online community. This motivates us to propose a broader definition of SNS.
Definition 2.1.1 (Social Networking Site). A Social Netwoking Site (SNS) is a website
that allow users to:
• connect with other users by befriending (Facebook), following (Twitter), subscrib-
ing (Youtube), ...
• interact with content posted by other users, for example by commenting, replying
or rating,
• restrict their own content to authorized users only.
2.1.2 History
The connection and interaction features of a website are the main criteria that should
be used to determine whether or not this website is a SNS. However, it is important to re-
member that these features predate the advent of SNS and already existed on the Internet
for quite a long time. For instance, many dating and community websites included the
use of profiles as early as the 1990s. Moreover, Instant Messaging services such as AIM 4
and ICQ 5 supported the concept of a list of Friends (one-way friends), although these
lists were not made to be visible to others. According to Boyd and Ellison [19], SixDe-
grees 6 that was launched in 1997 was the first social networking site. It allowed users to
create profiles, list their Friends and in 1998 it included the functionalities allowing users
to traverse the Friends lists of their Friends. Six Degrees was followed by more popu-
lar social networking sites such as BlackPlanet 7 (1999), Ryze 8 (2000) and Friendster 9
1. http://twitter.com
2. http://youtube.com
3. http://picasa.com
4. http://aim.com
5. http://icq.com
6. http://SixDegrees.com
7. http://BlackPlanet.com
8. http://Ryze.com
9. http://Friendster.com
9(2002). For instance, Friendster was originally launched in 2002 as an online dating site
[29]. While most dating sites focused on introducing people to strangers with similar in-
terests, Friendster was designed to help friends-of-friends meet, based on the assumption
that friends-of-friends would make better romantic partners than strangers would [19].
From 2003 onwards, a plethora of SNS was launched, such as MySpace and LinkedIn
in 2003, and Facebook in 2004. Nowadays, there are more than 300 SNS currently in
existence [83].
2.1.3 Classification of Social Networking Sites
The existing SNS are very diverse in nature and promote different types of interac-
tions and activities. For instance, Sharma [88] provides a comprehensive list of SNS and
classify them into different categories such as Books, Business Networking and Profes-
sionals, Family, Friends, Hobbies and Interests, Media, Students and Social Bookmark-
ing. Nations [73] summarizes SNS into three main categories: General Purpose, Niche
Sites with a specific theme and International Sites. Huggins [56] also identifies three
diffenrent types of SNS: Personal Contact Management, Business Networking Web-
sites and Cultural Trends Networking Websites. Finally, Privacy Rights Clearinghouse
[98] divides SNS into five main categories: Personal, Status update, Location, Content-
sharing and Shared-interest networks. As our main concern deals with privacy issues
inside SNS, we propose our own classification of SNS based on two criteria : (1) how
they affect the privacy of their users and (2) the types of information exchanged among
users.
2.1.3.1 Personal SNS
Personal SNS focus on giving the opportunity for users to connect with friends, ac-
quaintances and the family. The users often put up a large amount of personal informa-
tion on their profiles. Typical examples of personal SNS include Facebook 10, QZone 11
10. http://Facebook.com
11. http://qzone.qq.com
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and Google+ 12.
• Facebook, founded by Mark Zuckerberg, was originally designed as a social net-
working site for Harvard students. After spreading from Harvard to other univer-
sities and down into high school, Facebook was opened to the public in 2006. On
February 2012, Facebook had more than 845 million active users 13, of which 483
million are daily users [41] and has established as the leading SNS in 127 out of
136 countries as highlighted in a report of Vicos Blog [32].
• QZone is a Chinese SNS created by Tencent company in 2005. On November
2011, this SNS had more than 536 million users and was considered as the second
largest SNS in the world [62]. The most popular applications on QZone are blogs,
pictures sharing and connecting with new friends.
• Google+ is a SNS operated by Google initially launched in June 2011 in a Beta
format, and later publicly released in September 2011. Google+ directly integrates
different Google social services, such as Google Profiles and Google Buzz, but also
introduces novel features such as Circles, Hangouts, Sparks and Huddles.
2.1.3.2 Professional
The main purpose of professional SNS is to connect users with business contacts,
both old and new, as well as to help them to find a job or look for employees. For
example, LinkedIn 14, Xing 15 and Doostang 16 are websites that young professionals join
mainly to accelerate their career. The information on these SNS often includes business
contacts, expertise, recommendation and job offers. Most of the professional SNS are
structured in such a way that they can be used to manage customer relationships [56].
• LinkedIn is a business-oriented SNS in which members invite other persons to
be their “connections" (in contrast with the term “friends” used by Facebook).
LinkedIn is at the same time a contact management system and a social network,
12. http://plus.google.com
13. “Active” users are defined as ones who access the site through the web or mobile, as well as those
who do any Facebook action, such as Like a website or share tweets with Facebook
14. http://LinkedIn.com
15. http://xing.com
16. http://doostang.com
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and has a business related question-and-answer section where users can share and
receive business advices.
• Xing is a SNS for business professionals that has more than 11.4 million members
worldwide (as of September 2011) 17. The members of XING can meet and ex-
change views with approximately 50,000 group specialists 18, while also meeting
other members at networking events.
2.1.3.3 Hobbies and Interests
These SNS correspond mainly to places in which users share their hobbies and in-
terests such as movies (Flixster 19) and music (Last.fm 20). As such, most information
posted on these websites cannot be used to directly identify a user and are often consid-
ered to be less sensible with respect to his privacy.
• The motto of Flixter is to “stop watching bad movies". As such Flixter combines
a SNS component with movie reviews and can be considered as the leading online
destination for movie enthusiasts with more than 30 millions visitors per month
and 2 billions movie ratings 21.
• Last.fm calls itself a social music site. In a nutshell, Last.fm allows registered
users to create their own radio station that learns the musical tastes of a person and
suggests new tunes personalized to the user interest. In addition, users can listen
to the radio stations of friends and other Last.fm users.
2.1.3.4 Functional
Functional SNS provide different specific functionalities such as blogging, photos
sharing, status sharing, social bookmarking and reviews of product. Often, these SNS
does not necessarily capture demographic information but rather a large amount of per-
17. http://corporate.xing.com/no_cache/english/company/xing-ag/
18. Recognized experts with specialist knowledge of their particular field of work
19. http://flixter.com
20. http://last.fm
21. http://www.flixster.com/about/
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sonal information such as pictures. Examples of functional SNS include LiveJournal 22
(blog), Picasa 23 and Flickr 24 (picture sharing), Digg 25 and StumbleUpon 26 (social
bookmarking), Consmr 27 (product reviews).
• Livejournalis a virtual community in which Internet users can manage a blog or
a diary. In February 2012, more than 35 million accounts existed on LiveJournal
with however only 1,9 millions listed as “active in some way” 28.
• Flickr is an image and video hosting website gathering an online community cre-
ated by Ludicorp in 2004 and acquired by Yahoo one year later. Beside being
a popular website for users to share and embed personal pictures, the service is
widely used by bloggers to host images that they embed in blogs and social me-
dia. In June 2011, Yahoo reported that Flickr had a total of 51 million registered
members and 80 million unique visitors 29.
• Twitter is at the same time a microblogging service and a SNS that enables its users
to send and read text-based posts of up to 140 characters known as“tweets". Twit-
ter was originally created in March 2006 by Jack Dorsey and launched the same
year in July. The service quickly gained a worldwide popularity with over 300
million users as of March 2011, generating over 300 million tweets and handling
over 1.6 billion search queries per day 30.
2.2 Features of SNS
The boundaries between the different types of SNS presented previously is not so
clear and becomes fuzzier as many technologies exist to link different SNS together
such as RSS and OpenID.
In this subsection, we will detail the different parts that we believe as being central to
22. http://livejournal.com
23. http://picasa.com
24. http://flickr.com
25. http://digg.com
26. http://stumbleupon.com
27. http://consmr.com
28. http://www.livejournal.com/stats.bml
29. http://advertising.yahoo.com/article/flickr.html
30. http://yearinreview.twitter.com/en/whojoined.html
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a SNS: Profile, Friends, Networking features, Social applications and APIs, and Privacy
and Security.
2.2.1 Profile
Profiles can be considered as being the basic bricks of SNS. Profiles typically contain
basic demographic information about the user such as name, gender, hometown and
current location, . . . Alongside this basic personal information, most SNS also encourage
users to write a short biography about themselves and to share their tastes and interests.
While giving all this information may not be mandatory to register to a SNS, many users
often fill their profiles in great details. In some SNS, users can customize their profile
page by using skins, web widgets or their own HTML or CSS code. In consequence,
the profile of a user ranges from very detailed like the Timeline feature in Facebook (see
Figure 2.2) to very simple with only basic information such as Twitter (see Figure 2.3).
Figure 2.2: Facebook Profile with a Timeline view.
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Figure 2.3: Twitter profile.
2.2.2 Friends
Most SNS are designed and built around the concept of “Friends”. On a SNS, a
Friend can be a friend, a family member, an acquaintance, a friend of a friend, or even
someone that the user has never met before except online. In 2009, the average number
of Facebook friends that a person has is 120 31. A SNS enables a user to keep track of the
activities of his friends: for instance, when they post a new picture, update their profile,
change their status or buy something new online.
A SNS generally has a search functionality that can help a user find new Friends. For
instance, users can search for friends sharing the same hobbies, belonging to a certain
age group, or living in some part of the world. The “friend” relationship can be either
symmetric or asymmetric. If the relationship is asymmetric, when a user finds the profile
31. Facebook Statistics (http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=
55257228858&ref=mf).
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page of a potential Friend, he can directly “follow” that person without requiring his
approval. In contrast in the case of a symmetric relationship, the SNS will first send
a message to the other user requesting his approval of the Friendship. Afterwards upon
approval of the friend request, the relationship becomes visible through the list of Friends
of both users. For example in Google+, users can see which users have added them into
their social Circles and can choose to add these persons into their circle as well (see
Figure 6.1).
Figure 2.4: Friends and Circle in Google+.
2.2.3 Networking features
Besides the friendship relationship, some SNS also propose networking features to
facilitate the interaction between users such as groups, chat rooms, instant messaging
and bulletins. Each SNS also has its own particular features such as the ability to “poke”
users on Facebook or “high five” a person on Hi5.
• Groups.
Most SNS rely on the notion of group to help users find people with similar in-
terests or engage in discussions on certain topics. A group can be anything from
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“University of Montréal” to “People Who Like Books”. Sometimes, groups are
called by other names, such as “networks” on Facebook.
• Events.
Events is a networking feature enabling Friends to learn about the coming of new
events in their community as well as to organize social gatherings. For instance,
on MySpace, it is possible to post a quiz or to decorate an Event page.
• Tags. A tag is a non-hierarchical keyword or term assigned to a piece of infor-
mation 32. For instance, a tag can be an internet bookmark, a digital picture or a
computer file. This type of metadata describe an item and allows to find it through
browsing or searching. Usually in most of the SNS, a user can associate any num-
ber of textual tags to a picture, and then browse through his albums by tags. In
Facebook and Friendster, this step is taken even a step further by allowing users to
associate a tag with a specific area of a picture. For example, a picture of a family
in front of a landmark can have the individual faces of family members tagged
with their first names and the landmark tagged with its name. If the tagged subject
is not a member of Facebook, then the tag remains in plain text when the picture
is published. However, as soon as the tagged subject registers in Facebook, his tag
is transformed into a hyperlink to his Profile. When a user is tagged in a picture,
he generally receives a brief notice.
• News Feeds. A Feed is a document (often XML-based) containing content items
with web links to longer versions. RSS are useful tools to stay in contact with
Friends. For instance, profile updates, blog posts and pictures and videos upload
are often disseminated in the form of news feed (see Figure 2.5). The two main
formats of web feeds are RSS and Atom. RSS has gained better popularity as it
was implemented much sooner than Atom (1999 versus 2005). Atom, on the other
hand, provides a mechanism to explicitly and unambiguously label the type of
content being provided by the entry, and allows for a broad variety of payload types
including plain text, escaped HTML, XHTML, XML, and references to external
content such as documents, video and audio streams.[20]
32. Computer Desktop Encyclopedia.
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Figure 2.5: New Feeds in LinkedIn.
• Location Sharing. Most of the SNS let their users share their location whenever
they update their status or post a new comment. For instance, when a user uploads
a photo to Flickr, he can specify in which place this photo was taken (see Figure
2.6). The system can also automatically import location data from photos if the
user so choose.
2.2.4 Social Applications and APIs
SNS, such as Facebook and Google+, include a vast number of social applications
that users can add to their profiles. This was made possible because these SNS have
18
Figure 2.6: Photo location in Flickr.
opened their interfaces to third-party developers who design and implement applications
for the SNS platform. Each SNS offers its own brand of games and activities. For ex-
ample, Bumper Stickers is a popular application in MySpace by which users can choose
funny stickers to leave on their friends profile. This application was launched on April
2008, and by August 2008, 2.4 million users had installed it.
Facebook was the first to release a social networking API for third-party develop-
ers in May 2007. Applications built using this API pose serious privacy issues as the
“installed” application can query the API for the user’s personal information as well as
for information about the friends of the user (see Figure 2.7). Since the release of the
Facebook Platform, 19 other sites, including Bebo 33, Friendster, Hi5 34, Imeem 35, MyS-
33. http://www.bebo.com
34. http://www.hi5.com
35. http://www.imeem.com
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pace, Ning 36, Orkut 37, LinkedIn and XING 38, have joined together to support Google’s
OpenSocial, which defines a common API for social applications across multiple SNS.
The development of OpenSocial is overseen and managed by the non-profit OpenSocial
Foundation 39. Applications implementing the OpenSocial APIs are made to be inter-
operable with any social network system supporting them. However, these new APIs,
which are usually based on HTML, JavaScript and Google Gadgets 40, suffer from the
same privacy concerns as Facebook (see Figure 2.8).
Figure 2.7: Angry Bird game based on Facebook Platform.
2.2.5 Privacy and Security
Most SNS provide privacy settings that can help the user to customize how his infor-
mation is visible and who can access it. While MySpace only allows users to limit who
can access their page, Facebook lets users control who can search for them, how they
can be contacted as well as what stories get published to their profile and their Friends’
News Feeds. LinkedIn allows users to change the visibility of their profiles and select
36. http://www.ning.com
37. http://www.orkut.com
38. http://www.xing.com
39. http://www.opensocial.org
40. Google Gadgets are dynamic web content that can be embedded on a web page and are developped
using the Google Gadgets API.
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Figure 2.8: Google Docs app in LinkedIn.
who can see their activity feed (see Figure 2.9).
For the Net generation, SNS have become the preferred forum for social interactions,
from posturing and role playing, sharing photos to simple discussion. However, because
such SNS are relatively easy to join and to access, posted content can be viewed by
anyone with an interest in the users’ personal information. Privacy risks in SNS will be
discussed in more details in the next chapter.
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Figure 2.9: Privacy Settings in LinkedIn.
CHAPTER 3
PRIVACY IN SOCIAL NETWORKING SITES
Activities like chatting, blogging, commenting, posting pictures and spending time
on SNS such as Facebook and Myspace have become an important part of the online life
of millions of Internet users. SNS record all the interactions occurring between users
through the social network and retain them for potential uses such as profiling through
data mining or the improvement or development of new services. Due to the high number
of activities available on a SNS, large amount of personal information are collected on
a daily basis and this information can be very diverse. In recent years, the reputation
of SNS has been damaged by a number of privacy incidents relayed by news media and
therefore SNS users have good reasons to be concerned about their privacy. Personal
information disclosed from SNS could affect users’ life, with privacy risks ranging from
simple embarrassment to ruining their reputation, or even identity theft. Recently, a
health department official in Washington used the message functionality of Facebook
to get in touch with a teenager about her sexually transmitted disease (STD). The girl
received a message saying that she needed to call the Spokane Regional Health District
for important information about her health. The actual STD diagnosis was not included
in the post, but the girl’s mother says this is still a violation of her privacy [8].
In this chapter, we first examine different types of risks as well as user expectations
regarding privacy in SNS. Secondly, we also briefly review the position of some privacy
regulations and laws with respect to SNS [6].
3.1 Privacy Risks
There are many risks related to privacy that individuals incur on SNS, but we group
them into three main categories: Security, Reputation and Credibility, and Profiling.
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3.1.1 Security
Due to the large amount of personal information circulating in SNS, users may be
exposed to online attacks, including identity theft [7], phishing, malware infection or
cyber-harassment. For instance, according to the Identity Fraud Survey Report of Javelin
on 2011 [60], people using SNS for five or more years are twice as likely as those newer
to SNS to suffer from identity fraud (6.9% for five-plus-year users versus 3.2% for newer
users). Moreover in a recent survey of 2011, Sophos points out that 67% of SNS users
surveyed received spam messages against 57% at the end of 2009 [92]. Phishing and
malware incidents also become more widespread, with 43% of SNS users spotting phish-
ing attempts and 40% receiving malware. In addition, it is also likely that there are more
unknowing victims. By collecting personal information available publicly in a user pro-
file such as first and last name, address and date of birth, cyber-criminals may gather
enough data to compromise the victims’ financial records, thus facilitating organized
criminal and terrorist activities.
Teenagers (especially young ones) are the most vulnerable age group for online at-
tacks. They are also at high risk of being approached by online predators or becoming
victims of cyber bullying. Online predators try to gradually seduce their targets through
attention, affection, kindness, and even online gifts, and often devote considerable time,
money, and energy to this effort [46]. Online predators are finding it easier and easier to
locate and communicate with potential victims on SNS through publicly shared photos,
profile pages and location-based services.
3.1.2 Reputation and Credibility
Reputation is the social evaluation of the public towards a person, a group of people,
or an organization. It is an important factor in many fields, such as business, online
communities or social status [36]. With the blooming of SNS, users’ online reputation
has extended beyond the World Wide Web and if the user’s reputation is damaged, it
can also affect his credibility in real life. As more and more people turn to SNS to
chronicle their lives and socialize with friends, they are also learning that their words
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and pictures are reaching way beyond the circle of friends for whom they were intended
[63]. For instance, stories of employees being fired due to social media slip-ups have
been numerous in the news over the past few years [70]. On June 2010, five California
nurses were suspended after it was discovered that they were discussing patient cases on
Facebook. This situation was investigated for weeks by both the nurses’ employer, Tri
City Medical Center in San Diego, and the California Department of Health before the
nurses were fired for allegedly violating privacy laws [95].
In addition, more and more companies use SNS to screen potential employees. In
a recent survey of Reppler [96], more than 90% of recruiters and hiring managers have
visited a potential candidates’ profile on a social network as part of the screening process
and 69% of these recruiters have rejected a candidate based on content found on his
social networking profile. As a result, users of SNS may lose job opportunities due to the
inappropriate information available on their profile. For instance, a teacher in Madison
(Wisconsin) was recently suspended after pictures of her with weapons appeared on her
Facebook profile [94]. Since the beginning of SNS, companies have turned to them
to determine whether there is something about an applicant’s lifestyle that would go
against the core values of their corporation. But in some cases, they are going even
further: Some have demanded applicants hand over their passwords so they can view
individual’s restricted profiles [99]. Moreover, users not only have to worry about their
own profiles but also the profiles of their Friends [66]. For instance, even when a user
profile is kept clean and professional, it may not really matter if their Friends swear, use
drugs, get drunk and put all these things with vivid details with a link to the user profile.
Moreover, SNS affect not only the reputation of the employees but also can cause
trouble to the employers. One of the first things many laid-off workers have been doing
during this recession is to update their profiles on LinkedIn [23]. One of its features
is “Get recommended” where the workers can click an online button and “Have col-
leagues, clients, teachers, and partners speak up for you". However, if someone has
been dismissed because of poor performance, and a manager has given him a positive
recommendation, the credibility of the company will be questioned.
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3.1.3 Profiling
Profiling refers to “the recording and classification of behaviours” as defined by the
Electronic Privacy Information Center 1 (EPIC). It has become an entire industry, some-
times called Customer Relations Management (CRM) or simply Personalization. Com-
panies collect information from a number of resources, especially SNS, to build compre-
hensive profiles on individuals in order to sell products and to compile dossiers. This is
often performed without the person’s explicit consent or even without leaving the chance
for him to opt-out of the dossier building process.
In order to maintain services, SNS providers have to struggle to earn money by ad-
vertising. In a recent report of comScore [30], personal SNS such as MySpace, Hi5,
Bebo, and Classmates accounted for more than 20% of all display ads viewed online
in United States, with MySpace and Facebook combined together delivering more than
80% of ads. These statistics show that marketers are eager to use these fast-growing net-
works to advertise their products. Moreover, an Australian online-marketing company,
uSocial, can help them to find potential customers. After trawling Facebook for users by
searching for criteria such as age, location and interests, uSocial recommends potential
customers to companies, which then approach them directly. For instance, a firm pays
$727 for each 5,000 users who agree to be its friend (or 15 cents per friend). “Fans",
who merely express support for a firm, are cheaper [38]. Facebook also offers a type of
advertising that allows companies to target potential customers by letting users click on
an advert to become that company’s fan. As a result, some SNS have become a network
of advertising rather than friendship.
Although collecting publicly available data is not illegal, SNS users do not have any
control on how this information will be exploited. For instance, it might be used by
marketers for targeted advertising or sold to governments for law enforcement purposes.
The collected data may affect a user’s welfare in the future as these profiles contain a
great amount of personal information such as Social Insurance Number, shopping pref-
erences, health information, household income or lifestyle habits, just to name a few. For
1. http://epic.org/
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example, if Bob boasts his fast driving attitude on an SNS, his car insurance company
may classify him as a high risk customer in the future, resulting in a higher insurance
rate even if he was never involved in any accident.
These privacy risks are much more noticeable in SNS than personal websites and
blogs because SNS provide a sense of intimacy created by the community of online
friends. With the motivation to communicate and maintain social relationships, the
amount of information revealed willingly by the users is much greater than on other
media. Moreover, SNS make it extremely easy to upload many different forms of per-
sonal information, such as age, contact information (including home address and phone
numbers), pictures, sexual orientation and music preferences. SNS such as Facebook
usually encourage users to use their real name, and Google+ even goes a step further by
requiring users to use real names and suspending accounts because the username does
not seem to be genuine [104]. According to a 2007 survey [37], 91% of Facebook users
and 62% of MySpace participants use their real name to identify themselves and 85%
of the respondents either currently share or would share pictures of themselves on the
aforementioned sites.
3.2 Users’ Privacy Requirements
In order to elicit the privacy requirements of SNS users, we rely on a study in which
focus group interviews and a survey of 210 subjects were used to gather the privacy con-
cerns of SNS users [64]. More precisely, the study investigates the privacy concerns of
individual users and how they impact the dynamics and self-disclosure of their informa-
tion on SNS. According to the results of this study, we can define the following three
main privacy concerns expressed by SNS users: general accessibility, social threats
coming from the user environment and organizational threats.
3.2.1 General Accessibility
General accessibility to profile information was the most frequently mentioned con-
cern. It refers to individuals being afraid of unauthorized access of the information
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provided on an SNS. Indeed, a report from Harris Poll [53] found that the majority of
young adult respondents have a good grasp of the trade-offs involved when using SNS.
For instance, an overwhelming majority (85%) of millennials (young adults from 18
to 34 years old) understood that participating to a SNS meant giving up some amount
of privacy. Almost as many (81%) specify that their social network profile was only a
snapshot of who they really are.
To deal with their distrust, young millennials are actively monitoring their digital
footprints, an activity that is not new for them, according to Pew [71]. Between 2006
and 2009, more millennials said that they took steps to limit the amount of information
available about them online than did respondents of older age groups. Older internet
users appeared to relax their vigilance online while millennials maintained theirs. More-
over, millennials were more likely than older users to change their privacy settings in
order to limit their online information, to delete people from their networks or other
friends list and to limit who could see certain updates and erase comments that others
made on their profile pages. However they did not stop there as 44% said they filtered
updates posted by friends and 41% removed their names from pictures that friends had
posted and tagged.
3.2.2 Social Threats from User Environment
Concerns about social threats are mainly related to the security risks stemming from
the SNS user environment. These threats range from tagging a user in unwanted photos
and leaving inappropriate comments about the user on their Wall or other public areas
to user harassment such as cyber-bullying or denigration. For instance, peers may bully
[43], belittle one another or post malicious comments. One possible consequence of
younger groups’ use of SNS derives from the rapid forming and dissolution of relation-
ships. The dumpee has the opportunity to slander, abuse or reveal information, such as
pictures, about the dumper [14]. A form of stalking behaviour is also possible, with the
dumpee continuing to follow the person’s activities. Even where relationships have not
broken up, friends may post materials that are regarded as compromising without seek-
ing the permission of the persons featured. One tragic example is the story of Phoebe
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Prince, an Irish girl who committed suicide in early 2010 [16], who can be seen as a
clear victim of this sort of abuse. Bullies from her school in Massachusetts had posted
horrible statements about Phoebe as well as tormenting her outside of school. Her death
thrust Facebook into the headlines again and clearly demonstrated how teenagers and
young persons could use the SNS to victimize and bully classmates.
A 2010 study of Vision Critical [100] showed that 78% of SNS users who visit SNS
daily have the impression that SNS are very dangerous places for children and teenagers.
Another study of Ybarra, Michele and Mitchell [105] confirms this concern as 4% of
participants from 10 to 15 years-old reported that they had received unwanted sexual
solicitation on SNS. Moreover, they feel that these networks are “ruined” by “scams”
and “sleazy ads.” The situation appears to create an environment in which users are
continually forced to assess the credibility of the persons and information they encounter.
3.2.3 Organizational threats
Organizational threats correspond to the privacy concerns that the members of the
focus group raised with respect to the information collected by the SNS providers. Users
tend to reduce self-representation on the platform when they fear that their information
will be collected, stored, and used by the SNS and other third parties [51]. Indeed, when
posting content that is covered by intellectual property rights, like pictures and videos
(“IP content"), users are required to grant Facebook with a non-exclusive, transferable,
sub-licensable, royalty-free and worldwide license to use any IP content that the users
post or in connection with Facebook. As a result, in the Pew Internet and American
Life Project’s “Reputation Management and Social Media” report [71], 28% of 18-to-
29-year-olds said they “never” felt they could trust a SNS, and half (51%) said only
“sometimes."
3.3 Privacy Laws and Regulations
Individuals may assume that the same laws or societal rules that protect their privacy
in the real world would apply as well to the digital world. However, the Internet remains
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largely unregulated and laws dealing with online privacy in general and SNS in particular
are still under development [28]. In this section, we briefly review the position of some
privacy regulations and laws with respect to SNS.
3.3.1 OECD Guidelines
The privacy guidelines issued by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) 2 in 1980 became the basis of privacy laws and related policies in
many countries, including the United States, Canada, Germany, Sweden, Australia, and
New Zealand, as well as the European Union. These guidelines involve eight principles,
which are often referred to as “fair information practices":
1. Collection Limitation Principle: The collection of personal data should
be limited and obtained by lawful and fair means and, when appropri-
ate, with the knowledge or consent of the data owner.
2. Data Quality Principle: Personal data should be as relevant, accurate,
completed and up-to-date as possible for the purposes of data collec-
tion.
3. Purpose Specification Principle: The purposes of data collection should
be specified at the time of collection and upon every change to these
purposes. The use of personal data should closely follow these similar
purposes.
4. Use Limitation Principle: Personal data should not be disclosed, made
available or otherwise used for purposes other than those specified in
accordance with Principle 3 without the consent of the data owner or
the relevant law authority.
5. Security Safeguards Principle: Reasonable security measures should
be employed to protect personal data against loss or unauthorized ac-
cess, destruction, use, modification or data disclosure.
2. http://www.oecd.org/document/18/0,3343,en_2649_34255_1815186_1_1_
1_1,00.html
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6. Openness Principle: The public should be informed about privacy
policies and practices, and individuals should be provided ready ac-
cess to the use and collection of personal information.
7. Individual Participation Principle: An individual should have the right
to know about data collection, to retrieve collected data, to change or
delete collected data in a reasonable manner and to challenge the denial
of these rights.
8. Accountability Principle: A data controller should be accountable for
taking measures to implement these principles.
The privacy laws reviewed in the following subsections have been directly influenced
by these fair information principles and the guidelines from OECD.
3.3.2 Europe
Early in 2009, the European Union (EU) Information Society Commissioner Vi-
vianne Redding invested significant efforts in encouraging all major SNS to draft and
adapt self-regulatory practices in order to improve the safety level for young users for
SNS. Eighteen SNS providers (including Facebook, Bebo, DailyMotion and MySpace)
have joined together in an agreement called the Safer Social Networking Principles for
the EU 3, through which the participants accept to abide by basic self-regulatory princi-
ples, including:
1. Raise awareness about safety and acceptable behaviors.
2. Ensure that services are age-appropriate for the intended audience.
3. Empower users through tools and technology.
4. Provide easy-to-use mechanisms to report illicit conduct or improper content.
5. Promptly respond to notifications of illegal content or conduct.
6. Enable and encourage users to employ a safe approach to personal information
and privacy.
3. http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/activities/social_
networking/docs/sn_principles.pdf
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7. Assess the means for reviewing illegal or prohibited content/conduct.
On March 2011, Ms Redding, now Vice-President of the European Commission and
EU Justice Commissioner, stated in a speech that SNS need to comply with the European
laws if they have information about European citizens, and especially the four pillars of
privacy laws in the EU [18]:
1. Right to be forgotten: Companies have to demonstrate the need for collecting per-
sonal data and the users have the right to withdraw or opt-out of any data collection
efforts.
2. Transparency: Companies have to fully disclose to users all information regarding
the data collection process.
3. Privacy by default: The default privacy settings should reflect a “true privacy”
level for the users.
4. Protection regardless of data location: Privacy standards for European citizens
should apply independently of the area of the world in which their data is being
processed.
3.3.3 Canada
Canada is a federal country with shared jurisdiction between the federal govern-
ment and the provinces or territories. Canada’s legal system protects privacy through the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Canada’s Criminal Code and a number of
provincial laws. For example, Canada’s federal private sector legislation, the Personal
Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA), last amended on April
2011 4, imposes obligations on entities that collect, use or disclose personal information
in the course of commercial activities. Ultimately, PIPEDA aims at striking a balance
between a business’ need to use personal information to offer services and products,
and an individual’s right to control how his personal information is used by that busi-
ness. This model code incorporates the principles of: (1) accountability, (2) identifying
purposes, (3) consent, (4) limited collection, (5) limited use, disclosure and retention,
4. http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/P-8.6/
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(6) accuracy, (7) security measures, (8) openness, (9) individual access, and (10) chal-
lenging compliance. As a principle-based statute, PIPEDA has proven to be remarkably
technology-neutral and continues to be relevant in the face of newer technologies that
were not even imagined at the time it was enacted.
Canadian courts are now familiar with Facebook and SNS and recognize that they
contain private and personal information. Several cases have dealt with the relatively
new issue of privacy and the production of the contents of a Facebook profile. The
majority of cases are from Ontario, but it has relevance across the country. Generally,
when the courts have determined that the personal information on a litigant’s SNS is
relevant to the matter before the court, they have ordered disclosure of that information.
Courts have also affirmed in these cases that determining the relevance of information
includes a consideration of privacy interests of the different actors. This may include
any prejudice to the litigants or any third parties that may result from the disclosure of
information from a SNS. However, courts have refrained from broadly concluding that
privacy overrides established production obligations and the determination of relevance
is made on a case-by-case basis. The test for relevance involves weighing the probative
value of disclosing the information from a SNS versus its prejudicial effect. Moreover,
parties must still prove the information’s relevance, and privacy is still a factor the court
considers when ordering disclosure.
3.3.4 Bill of Rights
The idea of having a Bill of Rights for Users of SNS has been around for some years,
but no large audience of users has actually collated the key values and principles that
should go into such a Bill of Rights and put them to a world-wide large scale vote.
On May 2010, the Electronic Frontier Foundation has suggested three basic privacy-
protective principles that SNS users should demand from their providers: the right to
have informed decision-making, the right to control and the right to leave [78]. Based
on these basic principles, attendees of the Computers, Freedom, and Privacy conference
held in San Jose in June 2010 5 have proposed the following Social Network Users’ Bill
5. http://www.cfp2010.org/
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of Rights:
“We the users expect social network sites to provide us the following rights in their
Terms of Service, Privacy Policies, and implementations of their system:
1. Honesty: Honor your privacy policy and terms of service.
2. Clarity: Make sure that policies, terms of service, and settings are easy to find and
understand.
3. Freedom of speech: Do not delete or modify my data without a clear policy and
justification.
4. Empowerment: Support assistive technologies and universal accessibility.
5. Self-protection: Support privacy-enhancing technologies.
6. Data minimization: Minimize the information I am required to provide and share
with others.
7. Control: Let me control my data, and do not facilitate sharing it unless I agree
first.
8. Predictability: Obtain my prior consent before significantly changing who can see
my data.
9. Data portability: Make it easy for me to obtain a copy of my data.
10. Protection: Treat my data as securely as your own confidential data unless I
choose to share it, and notify me if it is compromised.
11. Right to know: Show me how you are using my data and allow me to see who and
what has access to it.
12. Right to self-define: Let me create more than one identity and use pseudonyms.
Do not link them without my permission.
13. Right to appeal: Allow me to appeal punitive actions.
14. Right to withdraw: Allow me to delete my account, and remove my data.”
The voting of this Bill of Rights was opened until June 15, 2011 on Twitter 6 and
Facebook 7. To the best of our knowledge, the results of this vote have not been published
6. http://act.ly/23h
7. https://www.facebook.com/CFPBillOfRights
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yet.
In this chapter, we have categorized different privacy risks that a user incurs when
putting personal information on SNS and identified user privacy requirements for these
SNS. While SNS and privacy may seem a priori to have two opposite goals, the next
chapter will detail our proposed Privacy Framework which an SNS can integrate into its
design to enhance the privacy of its users.
CHAPTER 4
PRIVACY FRAMEWORK FOR SOCIAL NETWORKING SITES
Since their introduction, SNS have fundamentally changed the way people commu-
nicate and interact with each other. However, alongside with the wealth of applications
they offer, SNS also bring new risks due to the nature and the personal character of the
information they collect and store. In particular, digital data (and thus personal data)
can be easily copied, modified and disclosed without their owner’s consent or without
the explicit acknowledgment of other possible co-owners. In order to identifies the main
privacy issues that SNS users have to face, we have conducted our own survey to examine
the usage and privacy concerns raised by SNS [54].
To address the user privacy concerns detailed in Chapter 3, we introduce a privacy
framework tailored for SNS. Specifically, since privacy revolves around user data, we
have divided user data into groups having different privacy concerns and categorize the
data based on its inherent privacy risk and its importance to the users. Afterwards, based
on these categories, we describe a User Privacy Policy (UPP) that offer to users an
easy and flexible way to express and communicate their privacy concerns to other users,
third parties and SNS service provider. However, allowing users to express their privacy
preferences is only the first step to enhance the protection of privacy in SNS and is not
sufficient as such. Indeed, it is also fundamental to ensure that this privacy policy will
be enforced in practice by the SNS provider and more generically to design a privacy-
enhanced environment for the users. To this end, we introduce at the end of this chapter,
the concept of a Privacy-enhanced Social Networking Site (PSNS).
4.1 Privacy Survey
Our preliminary study is based on an online survey that took place during ten days
on September 2008 with 200 participants. Participants of the survey were mostly stu-
dents and professionals in Canada, in which 71.5% (144 participants) have at least one
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SNS account. These 144 participants are split mainly between students (51.39%) and
employees (43.75%), with a majority within the age group of 18-30 years (74.31%).
Moreover, the participants of our survey have a high level of education (59.72% have a
Master or a higher degree), which we recognize may induce a bias on the output of the
study.
The questionnaire contained 28 questions relating to demographic attributes (such as
age, occupation, gender, etc.), SNS usage (main reason for joining the SNS, information
put on the profile, relation to friends, etc.) and privacy concerns such as intellectual
property and fear of unauthorized data access. Some of these questions were inspired
from an earlier study on online privacy concern and protection on the Internet [21].
The survey was available online in English 1 and in French 2.
In the next section, we present our privacy framework derived from the results of this
study as well as user privacy concerns and privacy principles.
4.2 Privacy Framework
The Privacy Framework is composed of the categorization of User Data, Privacy
Concerns, Groups of Trust as well as Privacy Levels and Tracking Levels.
4.2.1 User Data
With the motivation to communicate and maintain relationships, the amount of infor-
mation revealed willingly by user on SNS is much larger than what users usually shared
on other media. In addition, SNS make it extremely easy to upload personal information
such as age, contact information (including home address and phone number), pictures,
sexual orientation and music preferences. Our study shows that 64.58% of the partici-
pants share photos of themselves on the SNS. Moreover, 93.06% of them are ready to
provide partially or completely all the personal information on the SNS if they are re-
quired to do so. In our study, the users have listed the different types of information that
1. http://spreadsheets.google.com/viewform?key=p7AZRICDTMB4yGleAbYOwOA&hl=
en
2. http://spreadsheets.google.com/viewform?key=p7AZRICDTMB5J8EhxCVkFbg
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they put on their personal profile (see Figure 4.1).
Figure 4.1: Information on SNS profiles.
Based on the answers to this study as well as the main features of a SNS (see Section
2.2), we categorize user data into 5 groups: Identity, Demographic attributes, Activity,
Social network, and Added content (see Figure 4.2).
• The Identity refers to information that uniquely characterizes a user (or at least a
small subset of individuals) and can be used to identified him such as his name,
his address, his phone number or his social insurance number [72]
• The Demographic attributes refers to characteristics of the user that are far from
being unique in the population such as age, gender, race or political view.
• The Activity lists all the activities performed by users through the SNS, such as
adding new Friends, writing a comment in the profiles of other users or changing
their status.
• The Social network refers to all the relationships of users in SNS, such as the
identities of their Friends or the groups to which they have subscribed.
• The Added content corresponds to all the additional information (not included
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in the previous items) that users put on their profile, including blogs, pictures,
musical preferences or video clips.
Figure 4.2: Different types of information put by users on their profiles.
4.2.2 Privacy Concerns
In order to estimate how much SNS users value their online privacy, we have per-
formed a k-means cluster analysis on the answers given questions related to privacy con-
cerns. For instance, this set of questions includes the following one: “Are you concerned
that the information you agree to share specifically with someone might be inappropri-
ately forwarded to other users?”. The answers vary from 1 (Not at all concerned) to 5
(very much concerned).
The k-means clustering algorithm when performed with k = 2 outputs two groups
with respectively 92 and 52 members. Table 4.I details the average value of each variable
for each group. For instance, members of Group 1 (63.88%) consider online privacy to
be an important factor while members of Group 2 (36.11%) seem less concerned about
privacy as their ratings are below the average.
Since it is clear that users may have different privacy expectations with respect to
each piece of personal data, we propose four privacy settings that corresponds to the
impact that a particular piece of user data may have on the privacy of a user: namely
Healthy, Harmless, Harmful and Poisonous.
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Table 4.I: Composition of the two clusters outputted.
Questions
Cluster
G1 G2
Average Average
Are you concerned that the information you agree to share
specifically with someone might be inappropriately for-
warded to other users?
4 3
Are you concerned that the photos shown in your profile
may be downloaded and transmitted by others?
4 3
Are you concerned that the people you only know online
are not who they say they are?
4 2
Are you concerned that other people might reveal your real
identity and personal information online without your con-
sent?
4 3
Are you concerned that your intellectual properties might be
copied or abused by others? (For example: articles, photos
and ideas)
4 2
Are you concerned about online identity theft, profiling or
phishing?
4 2
Are you concerned that the SNS provider might divulge
your information to other parties without your explicit con-
sent?
4 3
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• Healthy data refers to generic information about users such as nick name, hob-
bies, landscape pictures and music states. Specifically, even if an unauthorized
person can get access to this data, it cannot be easily tracked back to the identity
of the user. Therefore, we feel that a user can share this data with other entities
without really worrying about the effect on his privacy.
• Harmless data contains demographic attributes, such as gender, religion, age
group and political affiliation. The disclosure of harmless data as such does not
generate Security risks or Reputation and Credibility risks. However, it can lead to
Profiling as some marketing companies can collect this data and build a detailed
profile of the user out of it.
• Harmful data corresponds to inappropriate pictures or blog entries that may dam-
age the user’s reputation (e.g., a picture of Alex in his job uniform smoking pot).
Therefore, the disclosure of this data can lead to Reputation and Credibility risks.
• Finally, Poisonous data is all the personal information that can potentially cause
Security risks in case of disclosure such as the financial information or the name
and address. In particular, one of the main risk is that cyber criminals may use this
data to commit an identity theft.
The above classification of the user data is used by default but can be customized by
the user depending on his privacy circumtances.
4.2.3 Groups of Trust
Basically, these four Privacy settings (i.e., Healthy, Harmless, Harmful and Poi-
sonous) are graduated by how much the disclosure of such information can lead a privacy
risk for the user. Nonetheless, this categorization of user data is not sufficient on its own.
Specifically, the level of risk does not depend only on the type of data being shared, but
also on the person with whom this data has been shared. For example, allowing your sis-
ter to view your address and phone number (Poisonous data) might not be a risky thing
to do because of the trust you have in your sister of not sharing or using this informa-
tion against you. In our study, the average size of friends list varies significantly among
the participants from less than 20 friends (32.64%), to 20 up to 50 friends (27.78%), 51
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up to 80 friends (8.33%) and finally even more than 80 friends (30.56%). Most of the
participants admitted that they have some persons in their “Friends list” that they know
from real life but that are not really their friends (68.06%), or even strangers that have
asked them to be their friends (25%) or people they would like to know better (5.56%)
(see Figure 4.3). Moreover, around 26% of the participants of our survey admitted that
they have already disclosed to other persons some pictures and comments of their friends
without their explicit consent. Therefore, it seems likely that the privacy risks are exac-
erbated when the number of so-called friends is very large rather than when the user has
a small core of close friends that can be more easily trusted.
Figure 4.3: Which types of persons do you have in your friend lists?
Thus, according to the intimacy and trust that a particular SNS user has on his friends,
we classify the person that can have access to the user profile into four basic groups: Best
Friends, Normal Friends, Casual Friends and Visitors.
• The Best Friends are persons that the user trusts to the point that he can share
nearly everything with them. Often, these persons are also the best friends of the
user in real life.
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• The Normal Friends can be family member, relatives or friends in real life.
• The Casual Friends usually correspond to persons whom the user knows only a
little bit. For instance, the user may only be acquainted with them online.
• The Visitors could be users of the SNS or even outside not part of it. These persons
are not directly part of the Friend list but they might be able to view some part of
the profile of the user such as his name, his age, his location or his avatar.
4.2.4 Privacy Levels
Based on the classification of privacy concerns and groups of trust, we adapted the
four levels of privacy developed in a previous work [2] to the context of SNS. More
precisely, the four basic privacy levels that we have considered are the following.
• No Privacy: The user does not care about the privacy of his personal information.
Basically, this results in everyone being able to see all the information that he has
put on the SNS.
• Soft privacy: The user wants to show his Poisonous data only to his Best Friends,
while the Casual and Normal Friends can access to the data of the user, except the
Poisonous one. Finally, the Visitors are allowed to see only Harmless and Healthy
data.
• Hard privacy: Like Soft privacy, the Normal Friends can still have access to
Harmful data but the user put more limit on Visitors as they can only see the
Healthy data while the Casual Friends only have access to Harmless and Healthy
data.
• Full privacy: The user does not allow Visitors to access any information put on his
profile. Moreover, the Poisonous and Harmful data are restricted to Best Friends
and the Normal and Casual Friends can only access Harmless and Healthy data
only.
Table 4.II summarizes the access rights of the four categories of groups of trust de-
pending on the privacy level chosen by the user.
However, we think it is important to point out that a perfect level of “Full Privacy”
does not really exist in SNS as the main objective of a SNS is about the sharing of
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Table 4.II: Privacy levels.
No Privacy Soft Privacy Hard Privacy Full Privacy
Best
Friends
All data
All data All data All data
Normal
Friends Harmful,
Harmless and
Healthy data
Harmful, Harm-
less and Healthy
data
Harmless
and Healthy
data
Casual
Friends
Harmless and
Healthy data
Healthy data
Visitors Harmless
and Healthy
data
Healthy data No data
information. For instance, if someone really wants to keep some information private, he
should simply not upload this information of the SNS.
4.2.5 Tracking Levels
Besides these privacy levels, the user may also worry about being tracked through
profiles of other SNS users. Basically, there are three possible ways of tracking a user
on a SNS: by clicking a profile link in a Friend list of a user, by following the name tag
of a user or by reading information about a user through the profile of one of his Friends.
To take this aspect into account, we have adapted the three Tracking levels defined in
previous work [1, 52] to the context of SNS (see Table 4.III).
• Strong tracking: The user does not mind being tracked on SNS, whatever the
means used to do that.
• Weak tracking: The user does not care if his name appears on the Friends list of
another user but he does not want his Friends to be able to put a tag on their Profile
that is directly linked to his profile.
• No tracking: The user does not want to be mentioned at all in his Friends’ profile
(i.e., no name, no pictures, no tags) and he is unsearchable through the SNS.
We think of the privacy levels and the tracking levels that we propose as privacy
settings that can enable a user to set the good equilibrium between his privacy and the
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Table 4.III: Tracking Levels.
Strong tracking Weak tracking No tracking
Best Friends
Tracking allowed No tag No information
Normal Friends
Casual Friends
Visitors
utility he can get of the SNS. Indeed as the main objective of a user of a SNS is to
connect persons and to share information, a SNS would become useless by definition if
all the users of the SNS consider all their information as Harmful data and do not want
other users to see it.
4.3 User Privacy Policy (UPP)
In order to enable users to communicate their privacy preferences before allowing
access to their data, we propose to express them in the form of a User Privacy Policy
(UPP). This UPP will act as an easy-to-understand policy for other users but also as a
machine-readable policy for service providers and third parties [3].
Consider for instance the following illustrative scenario in which Alice has taken
some pictures and considers them as being “private”. Alice only wants to share them
with her friend Bob. In order to prevent Bob from distributing those photos without her
consent, she specifies a UPP stating that only Bob can access her photos and thus re-
stricting Bob from sharing them with other users. As such, the UPP is an effective mean
to communicate Alice’s privacy preferences to her friends, and in this case to Bob in
particular. Moreover, being a conservative person with respect to her privacy, Alice does
not want anyone else besides her friends to learn anything about herself through interac-
tions with the SNS, including her personal information and her contacts. However, when
a friend of Bob visits his profile, he can easily discover Alice’s name on Bob’s Friends
list. Moreover if that person mines the profile of Bob, he may also see all interactions
between Bob and Alice. For instance, he may be able to discover statements such as
“Yesterday, Bob comments on one of Alice’s photos”. In this case, a well-defined UPP
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(if enforced) would make Alice’s name “disappear” completely from Bob’s profile and
therefore becoming invisible to the eyes of other users.
Furthermore, the UPP can also act as a kind of contract between Alice and Bob.
Indeed, if Bob wants to become Friend with Alice, he has to accept and respect the
privacy preferences of Alice such as not disclosing Alice’s pictures and not mentioning
her name in his profile and albums. One of the advantage of the UPP is that it can be
easily adapted to work with any SNS. Overall, we think that the UPP should be able to
address the following questions:
1. Who can access to the data?,
2. Which kind of data is being accessed?,
3. How will this data be used? and
4. What kind of tracking is allowed?.
4.3.1 Related Work
The UPP is inspired from P3P (The Platform for Privacy Preferences Project). The
P3P standard is a protocol allowing websites to declare their intended use of information
they collect [33]. Its main purpose is to give users more control over their personal infor-
mation when surfing by enabling them to understand how websites use this information
and also evaluating if a particular website respect his privacy desiderata (also expressed
in the form of a P3P policy). P3P was developed by the World Wide Web Consortium
(W3C) and officially recommended in 2002.
When a website uses P3P, it defines a set of policies stating their intended uses of
personal information that it may be gathering from its visitors. On the user side of P3P,
the user has also to specify his own set of policies and to state which personal information
can be gathered by the websites that he visits. Then, when a user surfs on a particular
website, P3P will compare the personal information the user is willing to disclose, and
the information the server is asking for. If these two sets do not match, the P3P tool will
inform the user about this fact and ask if he wants to proceed anyway to the website,
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thus risking to give more personal information than he is normally willing to do 3.
Despite their advantages, P3P tools are often too complex and confusing for most
Internet users [39]. Moreover as many websites are reluctant to use P3P, when P3P users
attempt to access the majority of commercial websites, they experience endless pop-up
windows warning them that the website they are planning to visit is not compatible with
their specified privacy preferences. Microsoft Internet Explorer, one of the most popular
web browser, is able to display P3P privacy policies and compare the P3P policy with the
user privacy settings [55]. However, the P3P functionality in Internet Explorer will not
alert users if they entered a website that violates their privacy preferences. As a result,
users who wish to take full advantages of P3P functionalities have to install additional
software such as Privacy Bird 4 [24, 34]. Privacy Bird searches automatically for privacy
policies at every web site the user visits and gives warnings about whether each site’s
policies match the privacy preferences of the user (see Figure 4.4).
Figure 4.4: Privacy Bird.
The concept of UPP is also similar to the User Data Policy specified in the User-
Centric Authentication and Privacy Control Mechanism for User Model Interoperabil-
ity [101]. The User Data Policy is composed of two parts: policy about application
providers and policy about data usage. First, the policy about application providers con-
tains a list of trusted application providers and a list of blocked ones. Second, the policy
about data usage is the classification of user data that are accessible to the data provider.
The user can modify and update both parts of the User Data Policy at any time.
3. The P3P Implementation Guide, retrieved 10.02.2012 from http://www.p3ptoolbox.org/
guide/section2.shtml
4. http://www.privacybird.org/
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A popular way for users to share their work freely while maintaining control is to
publish their work under a Creative Commons license 5. Creative Commons licenses
apply to work that are protected by copyright such as books, websites, blogs, pictures
and other visual images, as well as to movies and sound recordings. These licenses give
to the owners of such works, the ability to express permissions for others with respect
to their work, such as the right to copy, to make derivative products or adaptations, to
distribute or to make money out of their work. Creative Commons licenses are attached
to the associated work and authorize everyone who comes in contact with the work to
use it in a way that is consistent with the license. Unfortunately, personal data is not
considered as a work in the same sense as movie or pictures so it cannot be protected
by Creative Commons licenses. For instance, if Bob has a copy of Alice’s Creative
Commons licensed work, Bob can give a copy to Carol and Carol will be authorized to
use the work consistently with the Creative Commons license. As a consequence, Alice
is now considered as having a license agreement separately with both Bob and Carol,
also she has maybe never been in contact directly with Carol.
Creative Commons licenses are expressed in three different formats: the Commons
Deed (human-readable code), the Legal Code (lawyer-readable code), and the Meta-
data (machine-readable code) [26]. Creative Commons have also been extended to SNS
through a third-party Facebook application [15] enabling users to choose a license for
their photos, videos, and status updates and to place a Creative Commons license badge
on their Facebook profile. Unfortunately, it is currently not possible to choose a Creative
Commons license using a fine granularity such as a per picture or video basis. Following
this step, Kang and Kagal have proposed a privacy-awareness framework for SNS called
Respect My Privacy [61]. This framework enables users to declare the restrictions they
wish to place on their data. Moreover, unlike Creative Commons that provides a standard
set of licenses, communities of users can easily generate their own privacy/usage ontolo-
gies. However, Respect My Privacy encounters the same difficulty as Creative Commons
licenses as the terms of use of Facebook itself still holds on this data regardless of the
attached license.
5. http://creativecommons.org/
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4.3.2 Specification
The UPP follows the spirit of P3P but not exactly all its principles. For instance,
likewise P3P, UPP is used to communicate privacy preferences among SNS users as
well as between the user and the SNS provider or third party applications. As many
companies are reluctant to adopt P3P, there are few websites on which the users can
surf securely according to their preferences. While UPP is issued by the data owners
themselves, and therefore everyone who wants to access the data of the user is obliged
to abide by this policy (unless of course someone tries to access this data in a fraudulent
manner).
When a user wants to limit the access to his data, he specifies a set of policies stating
which type of personal information can be shared with which types of users. In order to
become his Friend and access to his data, other users have to accept to abide by these
policies. The same principle also applies to the SNS provider and to the third-party
applications. For instance, the system will warn the user when the privacy policy of a
third-party application conflicts with his UPP. In this situation, the user has basically two
choices: (1) to accept to change his UPP according to that privacy policy or (2) reject
the application.
We describe thereafter the main elements of UPP, which are expressed in XML for-
mat (see Figure 4.5).
Figure 4.5: Elements of UPP.
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• The POLICY element. A UPP may contain one or more POLICY element. The
POLICY element corresponds to all the information of a policy and contains one
owner, at least one receiver and one access rights. The main attributes of the Policy
element are:
– Name (mandatory): name of the policy.
– URI (optional): URI of the natural language privacy statement.
• The OWNER element gives information about the issuer of this policy such as:
<OWNER name= "Cindy" userID="Cindy1234"/>
This element has two mandatory attributes: name and userID.
• The RECEIVER element contains a precise description of the object of this pol-
icy, such as a username, a group of users or an application. For example, this
element could appear as:
<RECEIVER name="CasualFriends" type="group" receiverID="CS1"/>
• The ACCESS-RIGHTS element indicates how the receiver of personal informa-
tion should handle this information and may contain multiple ACCESS-RIGHT
elements. Each ACCESS-RIGHT element contains the following attributes:
– DataID (optional): id of the concern piece of information
– AccessID (mandatory): id of the access right.
– Data type (mandatory): Identity, Demographic Attribute, Activity, Social net-
work, Added Content or Tracking.
– Privacy concern (optional): represent the privacy concern of this piece of infor-
mation: Healthy, Harmless, Harmful or Poisonous.
The ACCESS-RIGHT element can have different values, including no_comment,
no_distribution or no_tracking, weak_tracking, strong_tracking.
<ACCESS-RIGHTS>
<ACCESS-RIGHT accessid="a1" type="added_content"
privacy_concern="Harmless">
<no_distribution/>
</ACCESS-RIGHT>
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</ACCESS-RIGHTS>
Figure 4.6 describes an UPP of Cindy for Bob. All Cindy’s Added Content set as
“harmless” is viewable by Bob. However, Bob is not authorized to redistribute or share
them with others. Furthermore, Cindy does not want her name to appear in Bob’s profile
and requires “weak_tracking”, thus, Bob does not have the right to include her name in
his Friend list or link to her profile (tag) in his blog.
Figure 4.6: Example of UPP.
4.4 Privacy-enhanced Social Networking Site
Privacy is a fundamental right of each individual (e.g., Article 12 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights by the Assembly of United Nations, 1948) but is also a
notion difficult to define and formalize, which can take different flavours depending on
the context considered. Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PETs) are generally designed
to respect two important principles:
• The data minimization principle states that only the information necessary to com-
plete a particular application should be disclosed (and no more). This principle is
a direct application of the legitimacy criteria defined by the European data protec-
tion directive (Article 7, [40]).
• The data sovereignty principle states that the data related to an individual belongs
to him and that he should stay in control of how these data are used and for which
purpose.
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The fact that most of the current SNS does not respect the data minimization and
the data sovereignty principles is not a fundamental impossibility result but rather a
design choice made by the SNS providers. In the rest of this section, we will identify
different privacy criteria that SNS can implement in order to increase the protection of
the privacy of their users as well as propose our own definition of the Privacy-enhanced
Social Networking Site (PSNS).
Thereafter, we propose a taxonomy (possibly non-exhaustive) of privacy criteria that
can enhance the privacy of users if they are integrated within the design of a SNS. This
taxonomy will help us to classify and compare the different privacy-enhanced SNS pre-
sented in Chapter 6.
The privacy criteria can be grouped into six generic categories: (1) access control
mechanisms, (2) friendly and flexible privacy settings, (3) transparency and awareness,
(4) data sovereignty, (5) accountability and (6) reputation management.
Access control mechanisms.
• Customization of access control by groups of users and types of information. A
user generally possesses different circles of acquaintances ranging from close
friends to family members and colleagues. If the SNS offers the user the possibil-
ity to group his friends by categories of users (for instance by level of trust), then
this can be combined with a simple access control mechanism to restrict which
type of information can be accessed by each group of users.
• Customization of search. If a user can specify to the SNS who can search his
profile and which part of his personal information is relative to the search process
and which is not, this will enhance the preservation of his privacy. For instance, a
user might want to be totally invisible in the SNS for persons that do not belong to
his list of friends, thus ensuring the property of “unobservability” (not being able
to detect if a particular user is registered (or not) in the SNS).
• Active blocking of information related to users. Complementary to the customiza-
tion of the search information related to his profile, a user should also have the
possibility of removing tags of objects that point to his profile or hide his name on
his friends’ profile. For instance, the user may decide that some pictures are too
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sensitive and erase the association between this picture and his profile. Otherwise,
these pictures will appear when somebody searches for pictures associated to his
identity.
Usability of privacy settings.
• Besides being flexible and expressive, the personalization of the privacy settings
of the user should be done within an interface integrated in the SNS that is both
user-friendly and easy to grasp for a typical user. In particular, filling the privacy
settings should never become a barrier to the user because the interface is too
complex.
• The privacy settings should be integrated into the main activity to facilitate the
workflow (i.e., putting the privacy settings next to each post). Treating access
control management as a separate activity may distract the users from seeing the
context of their main activities while managing the privacy settings [57].
Transparency and awareness.
• Explicit privacy policy from the SNS and applications. For the user to be aware
of the privacy risks incurred by putting personal information on the SNS, a first
step is for the SNS and its applications to state explicitly how they will use this
information by expressing it as a privacy policy. This privacy policy should be
easily comprehensible by the user, which means it should be expressed in terms
that are easy to understand and not too complex.
• Privacy lens. The best way for a user to realize which information about him can
leak is to see how his profile will appear in the eyes of other users, such as specific
group of friends or even someone from outside the network. This feature is often
called a privacy lens and some SNS are already providing it such as LinkedIn
(“View My Public Profile as others see it") and Facebook (“View as” mode).
Data sovereignty.
• Ownership and storage of the data. It is important that the personal information
shared by a user on a SNS remains his property. For instance, the SNS should not
give this information to other entities or use it for advertising purpose without the
user’s explicit consent (normally as stated in the privacy policy). In the extreme
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case where the user does not want to trust the SNS with his data, it is possible
to imagine an architecture in which he could set up his own private server, which
would be responsible for storing his data and managing the access control. In this
situation, the SNS would only store the social graph related to the user (and not
his personal data) and act as a gateway to connect individuals. Another possibility
is to store encrypted data in the server of the SNS and to use an external channel to
distribute to friends the keys necessary to decrypt personal data. However, these
solutions seem to collide with the business model of most of current SNS and
therefore there is a risk that their integration may be slowed down. Finally, instead
of implementing the SNS in the form of a central authority, it is also possible to
rely on a decentralized solution such as a peer-to-peer network. In this type of
solution, the data is not stored only in one location but rather distributed among
the nodes of a network, possibly using cryptographic techniques such as secret
sharing schemes.
• Right to oblivion. A specific type of ownership is the right to oblivion, which states
that there will be no data retention from the SNS if the user chooses to leave and
that all his data will be erased. In particular, the SNS should not keep a back-up
copy of the user account with the excuse that the user will potentially reactivate
his account later.
Accountability.
• Tracking how a user’s information is disseminated. In the digital world where it is
possible to copy the information as often as desired, it is not easy to control how
information is disseminated once it is out on the Internet. However, it is possible
to imagine that by a combination of logs and techniques such as watermarking and
traitor-tracing schemes, the dissemination of information can be (at least partially)
controlled and that in case of a privacy breach, it is possible to identify those who
have previously accessed this information.
• Provenance. Provenance refers to the origin, the history of the ownership or loca-
tion of an object. For instance, it could be some metadata related to the provenance
of the user photo that characterize its content and origin. This metadata could take
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the form of an explicit privacy policy attached to the object or inserted in the form
of a watermark (possibly invisible).
Reputation management:
• Reputation system. If the SNS relies on some kind of reputation mechanism, it be-
comes more difficult for a newcomer within the SNS to perform privacy breaches
without his reputation being affected. Although actually almost no SNS integrates
a reputation system, we believe that this feature could become an important asset
to enhance privacy in future SNS.
Based on these privacy criteria, we define a Privacy-enhanced Social Networking
Site (PSNS) as a SNS fulfilling the following properties:
• Privacy awareness and customization. A PSNS should make the user aware of
some of the potential risks of sharing information with other SNS users. In addi-
tion, it also gives an easy and flexible way for to the user to express his privacy
concerns in terms of a privacy policy and to compare it with the privacy policies
of other actors such as the SNS provider, applications or other users.
• Data minimization. The user can check which part of his personal information is
accessed by the SNS provider and third-party applications and how this informa-
tion is used. In particular, the third-party applications should state clearly which
personal information of the user they need and how they will process it. The user
can then make an enlightened decision on whether or not to accept the third-party
applications. The PSNS should also have an in-built mechanism to control the
access to the information of the user and ensure that all SNS applications cannot
access more data than authorized by the user.
• Data sovereignty. It should be stated explicitly in the privacy policy of the SNS
that the personal data of the user belongs to him and not to the SNS that stores
it. For instance, the SNS should not use the personal data of the user without
its explicit consent and should not be able to sell it to other entities. Moreover,
if the user decides to quit the SNS, the latter one should explicitly delete all the
information stored regarding the user (and not even keep a copy for the uncertain
case where the user might want to come back later). The user should also have
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the possibility to track how his information is disseminated (for instance which
friends have seen which pictures) but also to control information related to him
that have been posted by other users (such as a tag on a picture pointing to his
profile).
In this chapter, we describe the Privacy Framework for SNS and the concept of User
Privacy Policy. Based on this Privacy Framework, we propose a taxonomy of privacy
criteria that can enhance user privacy if they are integrated into the design of an SNS.
We also introduce the concept of Privacy-enhanced SNS that takes into account these
privacy criteria. In the next chapter, we will present Privacy Watch, our own theoretical
proposal of a PSNS platform.
CHAPTER 5
PRIVACY WATCH
While SNS and privacy may seem a priori to have two opposite goals, we think that
the fact that most of the current SNS do not respect the data minimization and the data
sovereignty principles is a design choice made by the SNS providers. Therefore in this
chapter, we describe Privacy Watch, our own proposed implementation for a Privacy-
enhanced SNS [4]. With respect to the privacy criteria described in Section 4.4, Privacy
Watch currently fulfils most of them except for a few as shown by the analysis at the end
of this chapter.
Privacy Watch is based on the Privacy Framework for SNS detailed in Section 4.2.
This framework provides users with an easy and flexible way to specify and communi-
cate their privacy concerns to other users, third parties and SNS provider. In our system,
the user can choose to which extent he trusts the SNS provider. More precisely based on
his privacy level, the user will determine how much information he would like to share
with the provider. For example, in the situation in which the user chooses Full Privacy,
the SNS server is only trusted in storing an encrypted version of the personal information
of the user. As a result, this piece of personal information can be consulted at any time
by one of his friends but the SNS itself does not have access to this information (as the
SNS server does not know the necessary decryption keys). As the purpose of Privacy
Watch is precisely to protect the user privacy, the privacy level is set by default to Full
Privacy (see Table 5.I).
Figure 5.1 presents an overview of the architecture of Privacy Watch. Privacy Watch
is based on the hybrid architecture in which centralized server (the SNS server) is respon-
sible for storing the personal information of the user (but possibly encrypted). Users of
Privacy Watch install Client Privacy Manager (CPM) on their computer (for instance as
a Firefox or Chrome extension) that has the responsibility of helping them to maintain
the sovereignty on their personal information. Privacy Watch also relies on an auxiliary
channel such as an independent mail server to store and exchange privacy policies and
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Table 5.I: Default Privacy Settings in Privacy Watch.
No Privacy Soft Privacy Hard Privacy Full Privacy
(default)
Default Privacy
Setting
- Healthy - Harmless - Harmful - Poisonous
Default Friend
group
- Best Friends - Normal
Friends
- Acquaintance - Visitor
Trust in SNS
provider
- Best Friends
- Do not
encrypt data
- Normal
Friends
- Encrypt
Poisonous
data
- Acquaintance
- Encrypt
Harmful and
Poisonous data
- Visitor
- Encrypt all
data
Access control - Server side - Server side - Client side - Client side
encryption keys among users. This is a form of protection of privacy by separating the in-
formation between two entities (the SNS server and the email provider). A fundamental
security assumption is that these two entities are really independent and non-colluding
[5].
Figure 5.1: Architecture of Privacy Watch.
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5.1 SNS Server
The SNS Server is composed of three modules: Database, SNS Services and Server
Access Controller.
5.1.1 Database
This module stores the user data (encrypted or unencrypted) sent by the CPM, the
privacy settings of the users (including UPP and other privacy preferences) as well as the
logs of data access to the personal information.
5.1.2 SNS Services
This module takes care of all social services provided by the SNS such as Friends,
Blog, Profile, RSS, Tagging, Photo or Music.
5.1.3 Server Access Controller
Going back to Figure 5.1, we can see that each access to user data has to pass through
the Server Access Controller. The main purpose of the Server Access Controller is to
verify the validity of an access before authorizing the retrieval of data.
Most of the current SNS offer users the option of specifying the privacy level of
their profiles in one way or another. While MySpace only allow users to limit at a
coarse level who can access their pages, Facebook lets users control who can search
for them, how they can be contacted, as well as what information can be published on
their profile and their friends’ news feeds. An access control scheme is a mechanism
that grants (or refuses) access to some object (such as data or resource) to an entity
depending on the role and the credentials shown by this entity. While several types of
access control mechanisms are possible, such as identity-based, role-based, and rule-
based access control.
Most Web access today is performed using identity-based approaches [87] where
access to all or some of the data is granted based on pre-existing agreements. For ex-
ample, a user needs to provide correct login and password in order to enter a website.
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Role-based access [44] is similar to identity-based access, except that instead of iden-
tifying a particular user, an access policy is created to allow users of a particular group
to access various parts of the data. For instance, an administrator of a forum can clas-
sify the users in two groups: normal users and power users. The power users have
access to the Movies and Music subforum while the normal users do not even see that
these forums exist. The role-based and identity-based approaches are quite rigid and
difficult to set up in a fine-grained way [102]. As a result, these approaches are not suit-
able for social networking activities with frequent content updates and volatile nature of
friendship. Rule-based access control is more suitable for social networking activities as
access policies are expressed as constraints on the type, depth and trust level of existing
relationships [25]. This type of access scheme uses certificates to guarantee relationship
authenticity and enforcement on the client-side follows a rule-based approach in which
a subject requesting access to an object must demonstrate that he has the right to do so.
Our approach to the Access Controller is based on the modification of the rule-based
approach. The system provides the user with four basic groups of Friends by default
(see section 4.2.3). Based on these groups, the user can easily create or modify as many
groups of Friends as they wanted by specifying their UPP. The Server Access Controller
not only controls data access but also alerts a user whenever a violation of his UPP
occurs. More precisely, each data request R composes of five parts: Request ID (ID),
Requester ID (RID), Owner ID (OID), Request Data Type (Type) and Request Data ID
(DataID): R = (ID,RID,OID,Type,DataID) The Access Controller searches for the UPP
issued to the user or the application with the RID of the user who has OID. Afterwards the
Access Controller checks if the requester has the right to access this data or not. If the an-
swer is positive then the Access Controller retrieves the necessary data in the User Data
database and sends it to the requester. If the requester does not have the corresponding
access rights, the Privacy Controller informs the requester about the situation.
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5.2 Client Privacy Manager
The Client Privacy Manager resides on the user side and is composed of the Privacy
Advisor, the Client Access Controller, the Key Manager, the Accountability Manager
and the Personal Tracker (see Figure 5.1).
5.2.1 Privacy Advisor
The proposed Privacy Framework in Chapter 4 is quite exhaustive and is able to cover
most possible cases of privacy. However, normal users may have to spend a lot of time,
especially at the beginning, to understand and to configure their privacy settings. The
Privacy Advisor module recommends a privacy level that is adapted and tailored to users.
The privacy level of a specific user is acquired through an elicitation process in the form
of a question-response protocol between the Privacy Advisor and the user. The acquisi-
tion process should be both easy to understand (i.e., expressed in natural language and
non-legal terms) and flexible (i.e., capture a whole range of privacy preferences). The
Privacy Advisor also raises the awareness of users regarding the potential risks inherent
to SNS and guides them during the creation of their UPP.
In order to determine the privacy level of a specific user, the Privacy Advisor takes
into account three factors: user purpose for using SNS, user background, and user pri-
vacy concerns.
User purpose for using SNS
Ofcom 1 indicates that social networking users tend to fall into five distinct groups
based on their behaviours and attitudes [76].
• Alpha Socialisers are people who used SNS to flirt, to meet new people, and to be
entertained. They like to visit Friend lists and put a large quantity of comments
on others’ profile and photos. As a result, their network and number of Friends
are quite large but most of them are only Casual Friends. Alpha Socialisers may
also give out to Friends their contact details such as MSN address or telephone
1. The Office of Communications (Ofcom) is a government-approved regulatory authority responsible
for the broadcasting, telecommunications and postal industries of the United Kingdom (http://www.
ofcom.org.uk/).
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number so they can communicate easily outside the SNS. These actions can lead
to disclosure of personal information and therefore Security risks.
• Attention Seekers are people who crave for attention and comments from other
users. To get attention, they often post lots of pictures, primarily themselves
and Friends in “suggestive poses, partying, drinking and portraying ‘glamorous’
lifestyles...” [76]. Their social network is quite extensible; nonetheless they tend to
have active online connection with only a few Friends. Due to the large number of
picture divulgation, the Attention Seekers are the most susceptible to Reputation
and Credibility risks.
• Followers are persons who joined SNS to keep up with what their peers were do-
ing. They often browse through Friends’ albums, and only occasionally exchange
comments and update their profile. Compared with Alpha Socialisers and Atten-
tion Seekers, users in this group are less likely to contact or meet people who they
do not know. Consequently, most of their Friends are Best Friends and Normal
Friends. In reality, these Followers on SNS have a moderate risk level of Reputa-
tion and Credibility risks as well as Profiling risks.
• Faithfuls are persons who typically used social networking sites to rekindle old
friendships, often from school or university. They often leave their profile public
so that old friends can find them easily on the SNS. For them SNS are useful tools
to strengthen existing offline networks rather than to create new, virtual ones. Due
to the profile being public, the Faithfuls are easy victims of Profiling and Security
risks.
• Functionals are a minority of persons who tended to be single-minded in using
SNS for a specific purpose, such as organizing parties, viewing photos or doing
charity work. Ofcom [76] reported that most of them were pestered to join SNS by
friends who are more involved . They are occasional users and generally log on for
short visits. These users also suffer privacy risks because they do not spend time
to learn about the possible privacy settings and leave their profile in the default
state.
Users of each group have different notions of privacy and how they should behave
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on SNS. We created a questionnaire, denoted as Q1 in order to elicit the social group of
a user (see Table 5.II).
Table 5.II: Questionaire Q1.
1. What is your main reason for joining the SNS?
a. To entertain and have fun.
b. To introduce myself to the world.
c. To connect with my real friends.
d. To find my old friends.
e. Other reason
2. When do you visit your page?
a. Every 5 minutes.
b. When I have some new photos.
c. When my friends tell me.
d. Once in a while.
User background
User background is also an important factor in determining user privacy level. For
instance, consider the age of a user: a user less than 12 years old is more likely to be
targeted by online predators, whereas a 30-year-old should pay more attention to the
shared information due to the risk of being victim of identity theft. Moreover, if the
user is a student or an employee, he should pay attention to the policy of his school or
company. If the user intends to apply for a job in a near future, he should remove all
information that could damage his reputation and credibility in the eyes of recruiters,
thus exercising his right to be forgotten.
We created another questionnaire, referred thereafter as Q2, to learn more about the
user background than just the information available in his profile. Table 5.III displays
some questions of Q2.
Table 5.III: Questionaire Q2.
1. How old are you?
a. Less than 15 years old.
b. 16-30 years old.
c. 31-55 years old.
d. Above 56 years old.
2. What is your status?
a. Student in high school.
b. Student in university.
c. Employee.
d. Retired.
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User concern
Users can decide to protect themselves against Security risks, Reputation and Cred-
ibility risks, Profiling risks or all of them (see Section3.1). We created a questionnaire,
denoted as Q3 in order to elicit user privacy concerns (see Table 5.IV).
Table 5.IV: Questionaire Q3.
1. Are you concerned that the SNS provider
might divulge your information to other
parties without your explicit consent?
a. Not at all.
b. Somewhat.
c. Moderately.
d. Quite a bit.
e. Very much.
2. Are you concerned about online identity
theft, cyberbullying or phishing?
a. Not at all.
b. Somewhat.
c. Moderately.
d. Quite a bit.
e. Very much.
• Security risks include phishing, cyber bullying, online predator, and identity theft.
In order to protect against Security risks, the user should not divulge their identity
information or financial information on their profile or keep this information as
Poisonous.
• Reputation and Credibility risks. User should set “inappropriate” pictures as Harm-
ful or Poisonous and only allow a limited group of Friends to access this data.
• Profiling risks. User should limit the access to their profile to Friends and not let
the Visitors access any information.
To summarize, the Privacy Advisor asks the user to answer three sets of questions
in order to determine his privacy preferences (see Figure 5.2): User purpose (Q1), User
background (Q2) and User concern (Q3). The process is decomposed in the following
steps.
• Step 1: When the user has answered Q1, Privacy Advisor builds up a stereotype P
of the user. There exists five main stereotypes: Alpha Socialiser, Attention Seeker,
Follower, Faithful and Functional. Privacy Advisor then lists all the potential
risks of the user’s activities and proposes the relevant Privacy level. Table 5.V
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summarizes these five stereotypes, their characteristics and the proposed Privacy
level. It should be noted that we do not recommend users to apply Healthy as
default Privacy Setting and No Privacy as default Privacy Level.
Table 5.V: Type of SNS users.
Alpha
Socialisers
Attention
Seekers
Followers Faithfuls Functionals
Numbers of
Friends
Many Many Medium Medium Several
Principal
Profile
Viewers
Casual
Friends
Casual
Friends
Normal
Friends
Normal
Friends
Casual
Friends
Frequency
of visits
Usually Nearly
always
Often Less than
often
Occasionally
Data Lots of
photos,
comments,
tags,
activities
Lots of
photos,
comments,
blog, tags,
activities
Some
photos,
comments,
activities
Some
photos,
comments,
activities
Not
applicable
Privacy
Risks
Security
Reputation
and
Credibility
Reputation
and
Credibility
Securrity
Reputation
and
Credibility
Profiling
Profiling Profiling
Proposed
Privacy
Settings
Mostly
Harmful
Mostly
Harmful,
Poisonous
Harmless Harmless Harmless
Proposed
Privacy
Level
Soft Privacy
No Tracking
Soft Privacy
No Tracking
Soft Privacy
No Tracking
Soft Privacy
No Tracking
Soft Privacy
No Tracking
• Step 2: Once the user has answered Q2, Privacy Advisor adjusts the proposed
privacy level to better protect him against unforseen privacy risks. For instance,
if an Attention Seeker is under 18 years old, his privacy level should be changed
to Hard Privacy. If the user skips Q2, Privacy Advisor still tries to get his demo-
graphic data from the User data database. During this step, Privacy Advisor also
proposes four Privacy settings (Healthy, Harmless, Harmful, and Poisonous) to
65
Figure 5.2: Privacy Advisor.
the user. For example, if the user works for a governmental organization, all blog
entries criticizing his organization should be classified as Poisonous.
• Step 3: During this step, the Privacy Advisor lets the user adjust his privacy level
(see Section 4.2.4) according to his privacy expectation. The Advisor also presents
four basic Groups of Trust categories and gives the user the possibility to create
more categories as well as provides him with guidelines on how to determine
the access rights for each Group of Trust (see Section 4.2.3). The user’s privacy
preferences will be stored in the database.
• Step 4: The role of Policy Builder is to help SNS users build their own UPP (see
Section 4.3) in a simple way. The Policy Builder relies on the information stored
in the Privacy Preferences database to construct a XML-based privacy policy so
that the user can restrict the access and uses of his personal information (see Figure
5.2). The users can read and/or modify the UPP in natural language or in XML
format. Figure 5.3 described how the UPP in Figure 4.6 looks from the user’s
point of view. The Policy Builder also enables the user to create more Groups of
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Trust, so that he can have more flexibility in defining his privacy settings.
Figure 5.3: Alice’s UPP for Bob
After using the Privacy Advisor, the user will be more aware of privacy risks behind
his social networking activities and understands how to customize his privacy settings in
SNS. Thus, Privacy Advisor helps raising the privacy awareness among SNS users.
5.2.2 Client Access Controller
This module monitors the access to and the dissemination of the user’s personal
information from the client side. When a user does not fully trust the SNS (which corre-
sponds to Full Privacy and Hard Privacy), this module will assume the role of the Server
Access Controller.
5.2.3 Key Manager
The Key Manager module is responsible for creating the keys used for encryption
and decryption, managing user public/ privacy key, as well as the group signature used
for access control on the SNS server.
In a nutshell, group signature scheme is a form of anonymous credentials that allows
multiple-show unlinkability. More precisely, it allows an entity to prove (possibly several
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times) its right of access to some data without having to disclose its identity (instead it
will only reveal the group to which it belongs). Group signature schemes were originally
introduced by Chaum and van Heyst to provide anonymity to the signatory of a message
[27]. In a group signature scheme, there is a single public verification key for the group,
but each member of the group receives a different private signing key from the group
manager (which in our case will be one of the users of the SNS). More precisely, group
signature scheme (with optional anonymity removing) consists of the four following
operations:
• Registration of the user. During the registration operation, the user assigns to one
of his friends, a new private signature key, denoted by σG,U .
• Signature of a message on behalf of the group. This operation takes as input a
message m and signing key σG,U and produces a signature σG,U(m) on this mes-
sage.
• Verification of a group signature. This operation checks the validity of a group sig-
nature. It requires as input a verification key for the group, VKG, which has been
setup by the user and is publicly known, as well as a message m and a group sig-
nature on this message σG,U(m). This operation produces as output either accept
or reject depending on the validity of the signature.
• Anonymity removal. From the point of view of the SNS provider, it is impossible
to distinguish if two group signatures come from the same individual or not due
to the unlinkability property. However in exceptional situations, the user can (in
association with the SNS provider) retrieve the identity of a particular signatory
via the anonymity removing operation. This operation takes as input a message m
and a group signature on this message σG,U(m) and produces as output the identity
of the signer U. In practice, this is done by first identifying the private signature
key σG,U from the signature and then retrieving the identity associated with this
key.
In Privacy Watch, we use the Groups of Trust as the basic groups. The users can add
and modify these Groups of Trust as necessary.
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5.2.4 Accountability Manager
In order to enhance the privacy of the owner (and co-owners) of a piece of personal
information (textual, visual, sound or structured data), we propose to attach to this infor-
mation some metadata related to its provenance as well as an explicit UPP stating how
this data can be used, processed and disseminated. The exact meaning of provenance
depends on the context where it is applied and the goal it is expected to achieve. For in-
stance, provenance represents the seven W’s (Who, What, Where, Why, When, Which,
(W)how) and could be used to assert ownership and attach an identity to an object [49].
Within the Accountability Manager, the metadata related to provenance contains the fol-
lowing information:
• Content of the data: The data type can be for instance text, picture, video, sound
file or blog and other information can be attached such as textual description of
the content or other related information.
• Source: The copyright holder (owner) of the data or the URL of the web page the
data came from. If this piece of data is related to several individuals, there should
be tags pointing to these individuals (if they are also users of the SNS).
• Creation date: The time when this data was created.
• Location (if applicable): The place where this data was created. This information
may not be available or may not make sense for all types of data. For instance,
while it is perfectly appropriate for a picture, it does not really apply to textual
information such as profession or phone number.
• Author: The author of the data (i.e., its creator) may be different from the copyright
holder. For example, in the case of a medical record, the author of this data might
be the doctor himself or even the hospital but the data should belong to the patient.
• Privacy policy: This metadata specifies which user and which privacy policy gov-
erns the rights attached to this piece of personal information.
• Timestamp: This metadata corresponds to the time when this provenance data was
created. The timestamp may be different from the date of creation of the data (e.g.,
a picture that has been shot 10 years before the provenance data is attached to this
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picture).
• Identities of receiver(s): This metadata clearly states the identities of the individ-
uals that have accessed and downloaded this piece of information.
In our architecture, this provenance data is either clearly attached to the personal
information associated with it and/or inserted in the form of a watermark (explicit or
hidden) if the data type lends itself to such action (for instance if the data is a picture or
a video file).
5.2.4.1 Encryption/decryption module
This module is in charge of encrypting and decrypting the data of users when nec-
essary. In Privacy Watch, we choose to use a Symmetric Encryption scheme, and in
particular the AES encryption algorithm 2. Symmetric Encryption is a type of encryp-
tion in which the same secret key is used to encrypt and decrypt information or there
is a simple transform between the two keys. Symmetric-key algorithms can be further
divided into Stream algorithms (Stream ciphers) and Block algorithms (Block ciphers).
Stream algorithms encrypt the bits of information one at a time - operate on 1 bit (or
sometimes 1 byte) of data at a time (in an online manner). Block cipher (method for
encrypting data in blocks) is a symmetric cipher encrypting information by breaking it
down into blocks before encrypting each block. A block cipher encrypts data in fixed
sized blocks (commonly of 64 bits). AES is a symmetric key encryption technique that
has replaced the commonly used Data Encryption Standard (DES). AES provides strong
encryption and has been selected by the National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) as a Federal Information Processing Standard in November 2001 (FIPS-197)
[75].
5.2.4.2 Watermarking module
This module manages the watermarking process such as the embedding of prove-
nance data into personal information or the decryption of a particular watermark from
2. Advanced Encryption Standard.
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a modified data. If the UPP is combined with the Privacy Controller, they can prevent
partially unauthorized access to user data. Indeed, a particular entity knows exactly what
he can get from the user profile and how he can use it. However, when he has already
downloaded the information, there is no way to ensure that he will comply with all the
clauses stated in the UPP. Therefore we need a mechanism that can insert ownership
information into the digital object. Whenever the ownership of a digital object is in
question, this information can be extracted to identify the rightful owner.
On a digital picture, a watermark can be as simple as a faint logo or string of words
superimposed over that picture. The main goal of placing watermark on pictures is to
prevent others from copying or using the picture without permission. For instance, many
websites put watermarks on pictures to indicate that a particular image is copyrighted,
and that it may not be copied or used elsewhere without the permission of the website
from which it originates.
Most programs for editing pictures and photo sharing websites provide watermark
functions, from simple to more sophisticated ones, such as Adobe Photoshop, Visual
Watermark, Watermark Studio, uMark, PicMarkr 3 and WaterMark 4 [103]. However, a
visual watermark has the effect of significantly decreasing the quality of a picture and
can be easily removed by using cropping or retouching tools. In contrast, digital wa-
termarking embeds information directly into the digital material in such a way that it is
imperceptible to a human observer but can easily be detected by a computer algorithm
[84]. A digital watermark is a transparent and invisible pattern that is inserted into an
appropriate component of some data by using a dedicated encoding algorithm [74]. One
of the main advantages of this type of technique is that the medium itself is not compro-
mised in anyway (i.e., at first glance it appears the same as the original data). Moreover,
watermarks do not get removed when the digital media is displayed or converted to other
file formats. These watermarks also undergo the same transformations as the digital me-
dia in which they are embedded. Digital watermarking can be used in conjunction with
3. http://picmarkr.com
4. http://watermark.ws
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services tracking the use of images across the web, such as LicenseStream 5, PicScout 6
and ImageRights 7 [103].
In a nutshell, a watermarking scheme generally comes with two operations: an en-
coding and a decoding operation. The encoding operation takes as input the original data
(such as an image or video), generates a watermark that is embedded inside the medium
and produces as output a modified version of this data integrating the watermarking. On
the other hand, the decoding operation takes as input a candidate image possibly con-
taining a watermark and returns either the watermark embedded inside the image or void
if none was found. Watermarking systems can be classified according to several criteria.
For instance with respect to workspace domains, it is possible to differentiate between
three techniques: spatial transform, discrete cosine transform and wavelets [48]. In spa-
tial transform, the watermark encoding takes place in the spatial domain, whereas the
discrete cosine transform breaks up the image into different frequency bands, making it
easier to encode watermarking information into the middle frequency bands of an image.
Finally wavelets technique, the watermark encoding is done in the wavelet transform do-
main, which provides multi-resolution representation of the cover work.
According to the type of detection, watermarking systems can be divided into blind
and non-blind schemes. Non-blind techniques use the original source in conjunction
with modified data to extract the watermark by simple comparison and correlation pro-
cedures. Even though blind techniques are more insecure than non-blind methods, they
have the main advantage of not requiring the original images to be able to detect the
embedded watermark [84]. Moreover, blind techniques working with a spatial transform
also have the shortest processing time in comparison to discrete cosine transform and
wavelet techniques [90]. Within the context of Privacy Watch, we have mainly focused
on using blind watermarking techniques.
5. http://licensestream.com
6. http://picscout.com
7. http://imagerights.com
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5.2.5 Personal Tracker
This module helps users to track how their own data is disseminated, both inside the
SNS and even outside (i.e., on the World Wide Web) by raising privacy awareness of
users through different data aggregators.
Data aggregators are people-search tools that look into nearly every corner of the
web to provide and gather information. These websites aggregate data from many online
(SNS, blogs, newspapers, online photos...) and offline sources (phone directories, birth
records, marriage records...) and are ready to sell these types of information to anyone
willing to pay for it. For instance, 123people 8 searches for people related information
that is publicly available on the Internet. The search results are presented in a structured
way for optimal usability and encompass results from traditional search engines, as well
as pictures, videos, email addresses and phone numbers. In addition, they also contain
social network profiles, blog entries, relevant documents, instant messenger IDs, news
and Amazon results. PeekYou 9 is a database of public web links belonging to over 250
million people. Its primary goal is to create a single public profile for every person,
summarizing his or her interests, work, schooling history, photos, physical address, e-
mail address, websites, gender, age, and other biographical information. To date, over
one billion links have been indexed. PeekYou provides a people search engine in which
users can freely access this information, whether it relates to themselves or to other
people. The site represents an opportunity for web users to control how their personal
information appears across the web.
Visual search engines can also be considered as a form of data aggregators. How-
ever, pictures are much more difficult to search than textual data, and therefore visual
search engines rely mostly on available tags and the text surrounding the picture [103].
However, using state of the art algorithms from Computer Vision, it is fairly easy for a
computer to analyze the visual features of a picture in order to extract a fingerprint from
it. On the other hand, it is very difficult to automatically attach a semantic to this picture.
By using its fingerprint, it becomes possible to efficiently compare a particular picture to
8. http://123people.com
9. http://peekyou.com
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the fingerprints of millions of other images in order to discover identical or very similar
images. For instance, TinEye 10 can find exact matches of the image it was searching for.
It can also find out the origin of an image, how it is being used, if modified variants of
the picture exist, or if a higher resolution version is available. However, the efficiency
of TinEye is limited and directly proportional to the number of pictures it has indexed
(2.1 billion so far 11). Gazopa 12 works in a similar manner to TinEye and has gathered
a database of more than 80 million pictures. Using this system, users can search images
based on the user’s own photo, drawings, images found on the web and keywords. More-
over, Gazopa enables users to search for a similar image by using a comparison method
relying on visual features such as a color or a shape. Google Similar Images also allows
the users to search for images using as inputs pictures rather than words, by providing
an option to click on the “Similar images” link under an image. However, the results do
not seem as reliable as TinEye [81].
5.3 Mail Server
This module is a third party email server such as Hotmail and Gmail that is assumed
to be independent from the SNS. It is used to store and exchange keys (for instance
encryption/decryption keys) as well as UPP between users (in case where the user does
not trust the SNS for doing so). We choose email as our key exchange channel because
it is an open and federated platform that lets users choose their providers or hosting their
own.
5.4 Scenario
When Bob registers to the SNS, he downloads and installs his Client Privacy Man-
ager (CPM) as a browser plug-in. Based on the recommendation of the Privacy Advisor,
Bob chooses his level of privacy among Full, Hard, Soft or No Privacy and specifies his
UPP. For example, as Bob is “privacy-addicted”, he chooses Full Privacy.
10. http://tineye.com
11. http://www.tineye.com/updates
12. http://gazopa.com
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The Key Manager in the CPM creates an account for Bob on the Mail Server that
will be used for key sharing. The Key Manager then creates different keys (KPS) for
encrypting many attributes of his profile as well as the public key of group signature key
(SKG) for each Group of Trust.
When Bob uploads the photo pict on his online album in the SNS, the Privacy Ad-
visor proposes to Bob a suitable UPP for this data according to his privacy preferences.
The photo pict and the associated UPP are sent to the Client Access Controller. The
Client Access Controller then asks the Watermarking module to verify whether there is
any evidence that the photo pict might belong to another user. If the answer is nega-
tive, the module embeds into the picture as an invisible watermark the public signature
key of Bob PKBob, the description of the UPP P as well as the signature of Bob on this
metadata σBob(P). Therefore, the photo pict becomes W (pict,PKBob,P,σBob(P)). The
Encryption module then encrypts pict with the secret key KPS. The encrypted photo
EKPS(W (pict,PKBob,P,σBob(P))) are stored inside the User data database (see Figure
5.4).
Figure 5.4: Watermarking and Encryption process.
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Bob can now use the SNS to connect with friends and choose to befriend Alice. The
Privacy Advisor proposes to Bob four possible Groups of Trust (Best friend, Normal
friend, Casual friend, Visitor). For example, Bob chooses to classify Alice as Normal
friend (see Figure 5.5). The Client Access Controller in Privacy Watch knows the UPP
that Bob has specified for this particular friend group and emails this UPP to Alice. In
order to befriend Bob, Alice has to accept this UPP and then her Access Controller now
stores Bob’s UPP. Bob’s Key Manager connects to the independent Mail Server in order
to send an email to Alice with her private signature key SKNormalFriends as well as all KPS
of the attributes that she is allowed to see as a normal friend of Bob.
Figure 5.5: Privacy Advisor
When Alice wants to see the photo pict, her Client Access Controller retrieves the
group key SKNormalFriends from the Key Manager, then sends a request to see the picture
to the Server Access Controller. The Server Access Controller then sends a random
challenge to Alice, which she has to sign with her private signature key SKNormalFriends
to prove her right to access this data. The Server Access Controller then sends the
UPP of the picture pict to Alice and requires her to accept it. Alice’s Client Access
Controller then returns the UPP signed by Alice to the Server Access Controller. After
that, the Server Access Controller saves the UPP together with Alice’s signature and the
current timestamp and returns the encrypted photo EKPS(W (pict,PKBob,P,σBob(P))) to
Alice. Using the symmetric key KPS, the Decryption module can now decrypt the photo
and returns W (pict,PKBob,P,σBob(P)) to Alice who can now visualize the picture (see
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Figure 5.6).
Figure 5.6: Information flow of Decryption process.
5.5 Implementation
In order to provide users with an access control tool we have developed a prototype
implementation that partially integrates the tools and functionalities described previ-
ously in this chapter. The prototype was implemented with the help of two other Master
students, Odilon Allognon and David Schönfeld.
5.5.1 Implementation Details
An SNS was created using the Elgg 13 open-source social networking platform. In
a nutshell, Elgg provides the necessary functionality for an SNS including advanced
user management and administration, cross-site tagging, powerful access control lists
and internationalization support. The prototype was developed as a Firefox 14 extension
13. http://www.elgg.org/
14. http://www.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/
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(see Figure 5.7) allowing client-side access control enforcement across independent plat-
forms. We choose Firefox because it is one of the most popular web browser and works
across multiple platforms.
Figure 5.7: Firefox Extension of Privacy Watch.
The Firefox extension development is done by using the following languages:
• XUL 15 for the user interface
• JavaScript for event management
• XPCom 16 for the object libraries
• Python for connection to email server, key management and encryption
The encryption was done using pyCrypto 17, a Python library. The algorithm chosen
is AES encryption in OFB 18 mode. An overview of the prototype is detailed in Figure
5.8.
5.5.2 Functionalities
Within the prototype of Privacy Watch, users can exercise the control over their data
and protect their data from the SNS. In particular, only members of users’ groups of trust
can be allowed to have access to a target content. In order to use the prototype, the user
first registers with the SNS then manually creates an email address on Gmail server (see
Figure 5.9). The Connection module then automatically retrieve all keys stored in the
email server and transfers it to the Key Manager.
The Key Manager module store all user encryption keys as well as the keys of his
friends inside an encrypted XML database. The prototype is still under development and
many functionalities are not implemented yet, such as the Watermarking and Personal
Tracker module. Currently four principal functionalities that have been developed are:
15. XML User Interface Language.
16. Cross Platform Component Object Model.
17. http://pypi.python.org/pypi/pycrypto
18. Output feedback.
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Figure 5.8: Implementation of Privacy Watch.
Figure 5.9: New User Registration.
1. Connection to SNS server and email server.
79
2. Key management and encrypted XML key database via email server.
3. Seamless decryption on friends’ profile if the user has appropriate keys.
4. Encryption of data based on privacy levels.
5.6 Analysis of Privacy Watch
The main objective of Privacy Watch is to provide an individual the possibilities to
review and partially control how his personal information flows both inside and outside
the SNS (through the use of data aggregators and visual search engines). With respect
to the privacy criteria that we define in Chapter 4, Privacy Watch currently fulfils most
of them. Specifically, the access control mechanism of Privacy Watch allows users to
specify their privacy settings in the form of User Privacy Policy for each friend, each
Group of Trust, each piece of data or even each type of data (e.g. different UPPs for
Harmful data and Harmless data). Furthermore, using the UPP with a specific Tracking
level, the user can make himself “invisible” to the search process of SNS as well as
disables tags pointing to his profile.
It is not easy to set up multiple UPP and to decide the appropriate privacy settings.
Fortunately, the Privacy Advisor comes to the rescue with personalized recommendation
of privacy settings. This module also helps the user better understand the potential risks
inherent to the SNS. Thus, it ensures that all choices of privacy settings are user-friendly
and easy to grasp for a typical user.
To increase the usability of the system, we choose mail server as the key distribution
channel as it is a mature, scalable, open and federated infrastructure supporting over 1
billion users [45]. The key database is also stored as email messages so that users can
access to it from anywhere that has an Internet connection. At first sight, this solution
may seem vulnerable to attacks. However, as the email created by the Key Manager is
used only for key distribution, it is not much exposed to spamming and outward attacks
such as viruses, malware, and other forms of malicious threats. Furthermore, because
this email address is a random pseudonym (e.g. c23e78ss1dd0078adcdu836@gmail.com
instead of aithanhho@gmail.com), it is not easy to guess and less likely to become victim
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of spamming and phishing attacks.
Regarding the criteria of Transparency and awareness, as Privacy Watch is only an
SNS platform, the requirement of explicit privacy policy from the SNS and applications
is not applicable. Nevertheless, because the users have the choice to trust the SNS with
their unencrypted personal data, Privacy Watch may encourage the SNS provider to pro-
vide users with greater access to easy-to-understand and transparent policy information.
Additionally, the Privacy Advisor also allow realize which information about him can
leak is to see how his profile will appear in the eyes of other users.
With respect to data sovereignty, Privacy Watch allows users to store encrypted data
on SNS server and decryption keys on a independent mail server. As a result, personal
information shared by a user on a SNS always remains his property. Moreover, the
Accountability Manager (see Section 5.2.4) can help users detect and trace the origin of
a privacy breach once it has occurred. Thus, the users of Privacy Watch are able to claim
back their privacy by asking the responsible person to erase this data or by providing
evidences to a third party such as the SNS provider or a judge.
Last but not least, as Privacy Watch is built as a generic PSNS platform, existing
SNS can be modified to follow the architecture of Privacy Watch, albeit with significant
code modification. As the SNS Server component of Privacy Watch is designed based
on Elgg, an open source SNS platform, it is not too different from the architecture of
existing SNS. While the Server Access Controller and the Privacy database have to be
completely redesigned, the SNS services and User database stay the same. However,
this choice is entirely depended on SNS providers as they have to allow users to store
encrypted data and/or fictional personal information, which may violate their own Terms
of use.
In this chapter we introduced the architecture of Privacy Watch, our own PSNS plat-
form. Moreover, we illustrated our system with a functional scenario. However, there is
still work to be done such as the reputation manager and the report spam/abuse mech-
anism. The comparison between Privacy Watch and other privacy-enhanced solutions
will be presented in the next chapter.
CHAPTER 6
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF PRIVACY-ENHANCED SOCIAL NETWORKING
SITES
In this chapter, we give an overview of solutions that have been proposed to enhance
the privacy of users of SNS [6]. These solutions can be divided mainly in three cate-
gories: centralized SNS, privacy add-ons and distributed SNS. We also compare these
solutions according to the privacy criteria identified in Section 4.4.
6.1 Centralized SNS
Most of the current SNS, such as Facebook, LinkedIn or Google+, are centralized
SNS in which the data of the users is under the control of a central entity that stores it on
its servers.
6.1.1 Facebook
Facebook 1 is a SNS that was originally launched in February 2004. Since its be-
ginning, Facebook has undergone a remarkable transformation. When it started, it was
a private space for communication with a chosen group. Soon, it transformed into a
platform in which almost all the user information is public by default. Today, it has
become a platform where users have no choice but to make certain information public
such as name, profile pictures, network and comments on a Page’s wall, and this public
information may be shared by Facebook with its partner websites and used to target ads.
Luckily, Facebook provides some powerful options to protect users online but it is up to
the users to proactively use them. For instance, Facebook includes the following privacy
features:
• Sharing. The user can use the inline audience selector to control who can see the
content he post on a day-to-day basis (such as status updates, photos and videos).
1. http://www.facebook.com/
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It also includes the possibility to tailor the personal information that a user shares
about himself (e.g., birthday and contact information) and even content that others
share about him (e.g., comments on his posts and photos). Facebook provides a
standard vocabulary of policies (i.e., no-one, only-me, friends, friends-of-friends,
everyone) from which resource owners may choose from.
• Tag review. The user will get a notification every time he is tagged before the tags
appear, therefore we can approve or ignore the tag request by going to see the
content itself.
• Apps and website. The user can control which information about him is shared
with websites and apps, including search engines. The user can view his apps,
remove any he does not want to use, or turn off the platform completely.
6.1.2 Google+
Google+ 2 is a SNS operated by Google that opened to the public in September 2011.
Google+ is built as a layer that not only integrates different Google social services, such
as Google Profiles and Google Buzz, but also introduces many new features including
Circles, Hangouts, Sparks and Huddles. For instance, Google+ includes the following
features:
• Circles enables users to organize contacts into different groups (Figure 6.1) for
sharing across various Google products and services such as Google Documents
and Google Calendar. Although other users can view a list of contacts, they cannot
view the circle to which they belong unless the user has explicitly chosen to make
it visible. The privacy settings also allows users to hide the users in their circles
as well as who has them in their circle. Organization is done through a drag-and-
drop interface that is quite intuitive. This system replaces the typical friends list
function used by SNS such as Facebook.
• Huddle is a feature available on Android, iPhone, and SMS devices that allows
communication within circles through instant messaging.
2. http://plus.google.com
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• Hangouts are places used to facilitate group video chat (with a maximum of 10
people participating in a single Hangout at a particular moment in time). However,
anyone on the web could potentially join the Hangout provided they possess the
unique URL of the Hangout.
• Instant Upload is a functionality specific to Android mobile devices, which stores
pictures or videos in a private album such that they can be shared later with other
users.
• Sparks is a front-end to Google Search, enabling user to identify topics they might
be interested in sharing with others. In this manner, “featured interests” sparks are
also available based on the topics that others globally find interesting.
• Streams allow users to see updates from those in their circles, which are similar in
spirit to Facebook’s news feed. The input box of a stream allows users to enter a
status update or use icons to upload and share photo and videos.
Figure 6.1: Google Circles.
At first glance, the privacy settings for Google+ appear to be fairly straightforward.
Unfortunately, some users discovered that the “resharing” feature could become a pri-
vacy issue as information shared within a private Google+ circle could be (re)shared to
the public, thus defeating the whole idea of circles [82]. However, it seems that a partial
fix is now available, as a drop-down menu has been enabled for users to disable resharing
after a post has already been made.
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6.1.3 Clique
Clique 3 is based and an extension of the Elgg 4 social networking platform.
Figure 6.2: Collection Wizard from Clique.
We describe thereafter some of the privacy features of Clique:
• Collections. Contacts are organized in collections, which roughly correspond to
social circles. Users can form different groups by defining close friends, family,
3. http://clique.primelife.eu
4. http://www.elgg.org
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colleagues and former school-friends (Figure 6.2).
• Flexible access control to content. All content contains attribute certificate policies
based on moving collections and contacts that can be defined using a simple and
easy-to-use graphical user interface.
• Visual audience indicators. Content are labeled with icons showing who has ac-
cess to this information.
• Fading relations. Depending on the activity of one’s contacts, these users slowly
disappear. At first, this happens through visual indicators in the form of a col-
ored border around user icon, and later by closing access to one’s data from the
automatically defriended contact.
Clique provides users with a social network platform that enables them to keep con-
trol over their privacy. More precisely, fine-grained access control mechanisms are avail-
able and configuration of multiple identities (e.g. family, personal, professional) can be
used for interactions with other users. When posting a data item, such as for instance
the name, birthday or profile photo on the site, the user can define for every single other
users whether they should be able to see it or not.
6.2 Privacy add-ons
All the most widely used SNS are based on a centralized architecture in which the
data of users is stored on a server in the hands of the SNS provider. Currently, many of
these SNS are facing criticisms and even lawsuits [59] regarding the way they manage
the privacy of their users. Historically, a first approach for helping users to protect their
privacy in these SNS was in the form of privacy add-ons that were integrated within the
existing systems, rather than constructing an entirely new privacy-enhanced SNS from
scratch that would face the cold start issue. We categorize the privacy add-ons into three
groups: Privacy Recommendation, Encryption and Hiding, and Access Control.
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6.2.1 Privacy Recommendation
Even though Facebook has recently changed and simplified its privacy settings in re-
sponse to criticisms from privacy advocates and the public, their privacy settings remain
complicated and confusing for a large proportion of users [17]. To address this issue
“Recommendation add-ons” such as Privacy Wizard [42], Facebook Privacy Scanner 5
and Privacy Defender 6 are useful tools that help users to properly configure the privacy
settings of their SNS account and raise awareness by making them understand which
parts of their profile are sensible and publicly available.
• The Privacy Wizard (still in conception stage) is an application that infers a privacy-
preference model by collecting gathering privacy preferences from users (e.g.,
what kind of information they want to show to their colleagues). This system
relies on the observation that users often define their privacy preferences by an
implicit set of rules (refer to as a model). Once learned, this model is then used to
automatically derive the user’s detailed privacy settings (Figure 6.3).
Figure 6.3: Privacy Wizard.
5. http://www.reclaimprivacy.org
6. http://www.privacydefender.net
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• Facebook Privacy Scanner is a bookmarklet 7 that can scan a Facebook account to
inspect users’ privacy settings and shows to users which parts of their profile are
secure and which ones are publicly available (Figure 6.4).
Figure 6.4: Privacy Scanner.
• Privacy Defender, another Facebook application, takes a step further as it not only
examines user privacy settings but also changes them directly according to the user
preferences. However, following the new changes in Facebook’s privacy settings,
Privacy Defender no longer works with the current version of Facebook.
• Reflective Policy Assessment (RPA) is a visualization tool that help users examine
their profile from the viewpoint of another user in their extended neighbourhood
in the social graph [9]. This tool could be implemented on the client side (e.g. as
a third-party Facebook application).
These add-ons heavily rely on the existing privacy settings of the SNS provider.
Therefore, they are also limited by these same settings and if the SNS does not provide
enough flexibility regarding privacy preferences they cannot really help. For instance,
as the current privacy settings of MySpace are very simple, a recommendation add-on
would not be really useful for this SNS.
7. A bookmarklet is an unobtrusive JavaScript stored as the URL of a bookmark in a web browser or
as a hyperlink on a web page (source: Wikipedia).
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6.2.2 Encryption and Hiding
The second approach to protect the privacy of the user is to encrypt or to hide the
data before uploading it to SNS server, therefore not trusting the SNS in handling the
personal data directly.
• NOYB (acronym for None Of Your Business) [50] is based on the observation that
some SNS can operate on “fake” data. As a consequence, privacy can be preserved
by restricting the ability to recover the real data from the fake data to authorized
users only. In NOYB, the user data is first encrypted, and afterwards the encrypted
text is encoded in a way to make it look like legitimate data. The online service can
operate on the encrypted data, but only authorized users can decode and decrypt
the result. A proof-of-concept version of NOYB was implemented in the form of
a Firefox plugin. The key exchange channel, necessary to send the corresponding
decryption keys to friends, is independent from the SNS and may be implemented
in the form of email, through the use of a third party or a peer-to-peer network.
Each user maintains one master key, from which the Firefox plugin generates keys
to encrypt each field from the profile. The master key is sent to the user’s social
network (friends, friends of friends etc.) via the key exchange channel. This
method raises the issue of revocation when the user wants to “unfriend” another
user, which may potentially require an update of the key distributed to all the
friends of a particular user.
• FaceCloak [69] follows the steps of NOYB by enforcing user privacy on the SNS
by providing fake information to the SNS and by storing sensitive information in
encrypted form on a separate server. FaceCloak goes a step forward comparing
to NOYB as it can also protect the data posted to a Facebook application (Figure
6.5). FaceCloak is implemented as a Firefox extension and only replace simple
profile information such as name, birthday and gender as generating fake informa-
tion that looks genuine for more complex data (such as activities and interests) can
be difficult. Moreover, FaceCloak supports incremental deployment and the users
can decide which information to make public or to encrypt. However, this appli-
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cation does not allow users to customize access control for each group of friends.
In addition, if the SNS detects that a user’s information (e.g., birthdate or email
address) is fake, it could easily suspend his account.
Figure 6.5: FaceCloak: A Facebook account under protection.
• FlyByNight [68] is a Facebook application for encrypting sensitive data that relies
on asymmetric cryptography (Figure 6.6). When a user first registers, he needs
to generate a public/private key pair and provide a password, which will be used
to encrypt his private key. The key generation and cryptographic operations are
performed by a JavaScript program located on the client side. The encrypted pri-
vate key is then transmitted to his friends via Facebook servers and stored in a key
database on the flyByNight server. FlyByNight also supports a “one-to-many”
operation that encrypts a single message for a group of friends using proxy cryp-
tography. In a nutshell, proxy cryptography allows a party to take a message
encrypted with the key of a particular and to re-encrypt it with the key of another
user without learning the content of the message [58].
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Figure 6.6: FlyByNight.
• Scramble! [13] is a Firefox extension allowing users to encrypt and share their
own data within any SNS (Figure 6.7). Scramble! relies the OpenPGP encryption
mechanism. Users can choose to store large amount of encrypted data inside SNS
or only list “tiny url” snippets, that point to the location of encrypted data into any
third-party server. Users’ public keys are distributed “manually” through e-mail,
website or key servers. Unfortunately, to the best of our knowledge, the current
version of Scramble! does not work with the latest version of Firefox (version
8.1).
• FaceVPSN [31] (acronym for Facebook Virtual Private Social Network) is inspired
from the concept of Virtual Private Network (VPN) used to secure traditional com-
puter networks (Figure 6.8). While the users cannot stop the sharing of public
information due to the design of Facebook, they can publish pseudo-information
instead, which inevitably can be seen by third parties but does not impact the user
privacy. When a user browses a profile of another user in the VPSN, a FaceVPSN
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Figure 6.7: Scramble in (private) Twitter.
component (in the form of Firefox extension) is in charge of transparently display-
ing to the user the real information, instead of the one actually published on the
host SNS.
The Encryption add-ons protect the data sovereignty of the users, because it is as-
sumed that the SNS providers cannot decrypt the “fake” data. However, if they detect
that the users’ information (e.g., birthdate or email address) is fake or encrypted, these
user accounts could easily be suspended (as mentioned in the terms of use of some SNS).
Therefore, it is not enough that the data remains confidential through encryption but it
also needs to be indistinguishable from genuine data in the spirit of stenography.
6.2.3 Access Control
When the SNS cannot be trusted to store users’ social network or its privacy settings
are not fine-grained enough, the privacy add-ons can provide a separate access control
mechanism.
• Beato, Kohlweiss and Wouters [12] have proposed to rely on cryptographic mech-
anisms in order to enforce access control in SNS. More precisely, they use the
OpenPGP standard for key distribution (like Scramble!), which supports the en-
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Figure 6.8: Profile Page in FaceVPSN.
cryption from one to multiple recipients. In this framework, each user has two
OpenPGP keys, one public and one private. The system generates a one-time-only
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secret key to encrypt the data and then uses the public keys of the selected audience
to encrypt this secret key. The encrypted secret key is transmitted together with
the encrypted data to the recipient. The prototype is developed as an extension
to Firefox and Elgg, an open source social networking platform that also forms
the basis of Clique. The data owner takes care of the access control enforcement
on the client side (using the Firefox extension with authorized recipients’ public
key), and as a direct consequence the SNS (Elgg) is oblivious to who has access
to which information as long as the requests are made across anonymous chan-
nels such as TOR 8 for instance. More precisely, the Firefox plugin first parses the
webpage and searches for encrypted text. Afterwards, if the user possesses the as-
sociated access rights, the plugin automatically decrypts the content and presents
it unencrypted.
• Lockr [97] provides an access control mechanism for SNS in which the identity of
a user is represented by a pair of public and private key. Before he can access an
object, a user has to either present a social attestation (i.e., a certificate of a social
relationship with another user) or his public key must be registered in the Social
Access Control List of the owner of this object. Within the framework of Lockr,
the users have a universally accessible address book for maintaining a single copy
of a user’s social network, as well as an access control scheme that facilitates the
sharing of personal data. The shared content is stored on a third party server. In
the current implementation of Lockr, the address book is provided by a Facebook
application called LockrCenter and the shared pictures are stored on Flickr 9. In
this implementation, the authorized user will receive a hard-to-guess URL of the
picture. One of the drawbacks of this add-on is that it currently only works with
pictures and heavily depends on the functionalities provided by Flickr.
• Persona [10], a prototype application integrated within Facebook, offers flexible
and fine-grained access control for user data by using Attribute-Based Encryption
(ABE). In this type of encryption, users are identified by public keys and their pri-
8. http://www.torproject.org
9. http://www.flickr.com
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vate key is associated with a set of attributes describing the profile of their groups.
A user will be able to decrypt a piece of data if and only if his attributes satisfy the
privacy policy of the group in which this piece of data is shared. Persona appli-
cations are accessible as Facebook applications and can interact with Facebook’s
API, thus providing privacy-enhanced applications through the familiar Facebook
interface. Users protect their private data by storing it on third party servers rather
than directly on the SNS. Only fellow Persona users that were given the necessary
keys for access rights will be able to access the data. Currently, Persona has been
integrated within Facebook as an application, and the users logs into that appli-
cation through a Firefox extension, which interprets the special markup language
used by Persona applications. However, choosing a separate server to host data
is not easy and requires significant investment in terms of energy and time that
makes the system not easily accessible for the majority of SNS users.
• Web-Traveler [93] proposes a policy-driven approach to control the access to pic-
tures posted on the SNS. In particular, users have to specify access control poli-
cies for their content as they upload it on the SNS. There are two kinds of policies
(positive and negative), which specify 5 types of operations: tag, comment, view,
download and upload. An image recognition component is used to detect the
similarity between the uploaded image and other images in the database. More
precisely, each image in the database is described by an index, which is a form
of fingerprint of its visual characteristics. The comparison process is executed
using this index. Another important feature of Web-Traveler is that it allows the
enforcement of policies across websites. However, the Web-Traveler architecture
cannot be implemented on an existing SNS platform without an important number
of modifications to the system core.
Privacy add-ons are a first step towards giving users more control over their privacy
on SNS and raising their awareness on this subject. However, the users still have to
comply with the privacy policies and terms of use coming from SNS providers and SNS
applications.
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6.3 Distributed SNS
More complex approaches have been proposed to provide decentralized solutions
that let users set up their own personal servers to fully control the information they share
and how they connect with friends. Paul, Buchegger and Strufe [80] distinguish two
groups of distributed SNS: web-based SNS and peer-to-peer (P2P) SNS. Web-based
systems rely on a distributed web server infrastructure and require the acquisition of
webspace or the deployment of web servers while the peer-to-peer systems take advan-
tages of the substrate of a P2P network in order to allow for the publication, search, and
retrieval of profiles and their attributes. In this section, we present several distributed
SNS, which up to now have been mainly developed in the research community and are
not yet fully deploy in the real world.
• Safebook [35] adopts a decentralized architecture relying on the cooperation among
a number of independent parties, which are also the users of the SNS. Safebook
has a three-tier architecture with a direct mapping of layers to the SNS levels (Fig-
ure 6.9):
– The user-centered social network layer implementing the SNS level.
– The P2P substrate implementing the SNS services.
– The Internet acting as the communication level.
As a result, each party in Safebook is represented by a node that is viewed as a
host node in the Internet, a peer node in the P2P architecture and a member node
in the SNS layer. More precisely, the nodes in Safebook belong to two different
overlays:
– A set of Matryoshkas, which are concentric rings of nodes built around each
user’s node in order to provide trusted data storage, data retrieval and commu-
nication obfuscation.
– A P2P substrate, providing lookup service (for instance through Distributed
Hash Tables (DHT)).
As all the published data of a user is replicated to its mirrors (the nodes in the
innermost shell of his Matryoshka), it is quite difficult to track how his data is dis-
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seminated and to execute his right of oblivion when he decides to leave Safebook.
Figure 6.9: Safebook architecture.
• PeerSoN [22] achieves decentralization thanks to an external P2P system, called
OpenDHT, and assures access control through encryption (not yet implemented).
PeerSoN has a two-tier architecture: a look-up service and peers containing the
user data, such as user profiles. The look-up service stores the meta-data required
to find particular users as well as the particular data they store. For example, this
meta-data could be their IP address, information about the files they stored and no-
tifications for users. A peer that wants to communicate with another peer invokes
the look-up service to retrieve the necessary information to locate the relevant
peers and then connect directly to them. As a result, a user can only visit the pro-
file of his friends when they are online, thus providing a low level of availability
compared to centralized SNS.
• PrPl [85] (acronym for Private-Public) is a decentralized architecture that lets
users participate in SNS while keeping the ownership of their data. With PrPl,
each user uses a Personal-Cloud Butler service to store their profile and also share
information with fine-grained access control mechanisms. In practice, a user can
choose to run the butler on any server of his choice. Each butler provides a fed-
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eration of data storage, meaning that it keeps a semantic index to data that can
reside, possibly encrypted, in other storage services. PrPl relies on the standard
decentralized OpenID management system 10.
• Vis-à-vis [86] is a distributed framework for SNS based on the idea of a Virtual
Individual Server (VIS). A VIS is defined as a virtual machine running in a cloud
service that can store their owner’s sensitive data and grant access for that data by
other parties. The VIS is considered trusted and is allowed to store unencrypted
user data. Each user has a key pair whose private key is stored securely on his VIS,
while the public key and the IP address of his VIS are distributed via email or an
existing SNS to friends of the user. Vis-à-vis also has a notion of groups, which
are location-based and can be accessed through clients such as mobile phones or
web browsers. The framework is designed to interoperate with existing SNS and
allows users to integrate Vis-à-vis group by embedding a group descriptor into the
Facebook group. When a user loads the group page on their web browser, a Vis-à-
vis browser extension interprets the document received from Facebook, identifies
the group descriptor, and rewrites the page to include information downloaded
from the appropriate VISes. Currently Vis-à-vis only focuses on providing secure
location information sharing for groups.
• Mr. Privacy [45] is a social application framework built on top of email, which is
used both as a communication channel and personal database. When a message
is sent to multiple users, each user receives a separate copy. As a result, once an
item is sent from one user to another, it cannot be invalidated and erased from the
framework, thus increasing the risk of privacy breaches and not guaranteeing the
right to be forgotten.
• eXO [67] is a distributed system offering fundamental social networking services
such as mechanisms for indexing content and related metadata and efficient al-
gorithms for search-for-users and search-for-content queries. eXO consists of a
large number of nodes, each of which runs a routing protocol for a structured over-
lay DHT network. In eXO, each user connects to a specific node with a unique
10. http://openid.net/
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network identifier. The content shared by a user is originally kept on the user’s
node but it can be replicated on other nodes in order to increase availability.
• SuperNova [89] is a super-peer based SNS architecture that tries to solve the prob-
lem of data availability in P2P network by providing incentives for other nodes to
store personal data of other users. For instance, when users do not have enough
friends to replicate their data, they can use the storage services provided by a
“super-peer”. Any user of the P2P network can volunteer to become a super-peer,
thus increasing its reputation or gaining revenue from advertising.
• The Diaspora 11 project was summarized by its creators as a “distributed network,
where totally separate computers connect to each other directly, allowing users to
connect without surrendering their privacy". This project is now opened for public
testing 12. The concepts of pod and seed are central to the architecture of Diaspora:
– A pod is a server on which Diaspora is running. The users can set up a pod by
themselves or use a public/ private pod.
– A seed is a profile or an account that contains all the data of a specific user. The
user’s seed interacts with the seeds of his friends to keep each other up to date.
Seeds are hosted on pod servers.
In the architecture of Diaspora, the users are able to move their seeds between
pods and they can leave a pod if they do not trust it anymore.
• Socialriver 13, another distributed SNS still at the conception stage, consists of
users’ “streams” of activity including blogs, photos and other shared data. Social-
River is built on top of Wordpress, an open source content management system,
often used as a blog publishing application. Users have control over their private
information and have the ability to block sites that use other software that do not
implement adequate privacy policies and settings.
11. https://joindiaspora.com/
12. http://dias.org
13. http://socialriver.org/
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6.3.1 Privacy Watch
Privacy Watch is an hybrid (centralized/distributed) system based on the Privacy
Framework for SNS (see Section 4.2) and the concept of User Privacy Policy (UPP) (see
Section 4.3. Privacy Watch relies on the UPP as an easy and flexible way for users to
inform and enforce (in the form of a contract) their privacy concerns to other users, third
parties and the SNS service provider. In Privacy Watch, the user can determine how
much information he wants to share with the SNS provider by specifying his privacy
level (ranging from No Privacy to Full Privacy). For instance, novice and casual users
can choose No Privacy or Soft Privacy and delegate the responsibility of the access
control management to the SNS provider. In contrast, if the user chooses the level of
Full Privacy, the SNS server will only be trusted in storing an encrypted version of
the personal information of the user, which can be consulted at any time by one of his
friends. An auxiliary third party, such as an independent mail server, is responsible
for storing and exchanging privacy policies and encryption keys between a user and his
friends (see Chapter 5). Moreover, by combining watermarking methods with access
control logs, it is possible to partially monitor the dissemination of information that
belongs to the user.
6.4 Comparison
In this section, we compare different privacy add-ons and privacy-enhanced SNS
with respect to the privacy criteria described in Chapter 4, by taking Facebook as the
baseline for “standard” SNS. Note that the reputation management criterion is not men-
tioned in the comparison as none of the studied solutions has implemented it yet.
6.4.1 Centralized SNS
Table 6.I describes the comparison between three centralized SNS: Facebook, Google+
and Clique. Most centralized SNS such as Google+ and Clique now have nearly the same
access control mechanisms as Facebook with fine-grained privacy settings for each piece
of data (per post). The users can share their posts and their data to specific audiences
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by listing the friend names or groups of friends. With respect to the search customiza-
tion, Google+ allows users to specify which part of their personal profiles is take into
account during the search process, while Facebook also lets users decide who can look
up their profile by name or contact info. Both Facebook and Google+ support tag review
in the sense that the users can approve or remove tags pointing to their profiles (i.e., tag
removal).
Facebook’s Friend group, Google+’s Circles and Clique’s Collections are mecha-
nisms that create groups of friends sharing similar interests or the same kind of social
relationship. Users of Facebook and Google+ can use an inline menu (i.e., privacy set-
ting integrated into the post) to specify who can access their posts. On Clique, the access
control policy of a piece of data is not directly entwined with it like on Facebook and
Google+, which makes it difficult to navigate through its privacy settings.
Nowadays, all centralized SNS already provide explicit privacy policy on their web-
site for the users. Recently, Facebook rewrote and simplified its privacy policy in or-
der to made it easier for users to understand it. Additionally, the concept of privacy
lens is implemented by both Facebook and Google+. Unfortunately, a recent survey
of the global strategic branding firm Siegel+Gale 14 reveals confusion and frustration
among consumers regarding Facebook and Google privacy policies. The survey of more
than 400 participants shows that users have little understanding of how Facebook and
Google track and store user information and activity, and how information is shared and
with whom [91]. Moreover, in their terms of use, Facebook and Google+ require their
users to give them a “non-exclusive, transferable, sub-licensable, royalty-free, world-
wide license” (Facebook) or “a perpetual, irrevocable, worldwide, royalty-free, and non-
exclusive license” (Google+) on all the content they post on the SNS, therefore not re-
specting the sovereignty principle. In addition to the absence of reputation system, these
three SNS do not provide accountability support for their users.
14. http://www.siegelgale.com
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Table 6.I: Centralized SNS.
Access control Usability Transparency Data
sovereignty
Account-
ability
Facebook - Per post and by
groups / friends
- Search
customization
(who)
- Tag approval
- Inline
menu
- Easy-to-
understand
privacy
policy
- Privacy
lens
- No - No
Google+ - Per post and by
groups/ friends
- Search
customization
(which part)
- Tag approval
- Inline
menu
- Complex
privacy
policy
- Privacy
lens
- No - No
Clique - Per post and by
groups/ friends
- Separate
menu
- No - No - No
6.4.2 Privacy add-ons
Table 6.II compares several privacy add-ons for centralized SNS. These add-ons pro-
vide simple and easy-to-implement solutions for users with privacy concerns. However,
they cannot completely satisfy all the privacy criteria mentioned in Section 4.4 because
they still rely on the existing infrastructure of the SNS provider and thus are limited by
the functionalities provided by the architecture. Moreover, these privacy add-ons are
bound by the privacy policy and terms of use of the SNS.
Specifically, the recommendation add-ons do not enhance the access control mecha-
nisms of centralized SNS but help users to optimize the privacy settings on their profile.
Reflective Policy Assessment visualizes the extended neighbourhood of the user’s social
graph and allows him to inspect her profile from the view point of another user. While
Privacy Wizard infers privacy settings on new posts based on user habits, Privacy De-
fender proposes three different privacy categories for the users to choose: My friends,
My Social Network, and Everyone but not everything. Taking a step further, Privacy
Scanner can actively modify users’ privacy settings to prevent their friends from sharing
102
their data with unauthorized people. Unfortunately, Privacy Defender and Privacy Scan-
ner are not fully compatible with the latest Facebook privacy settings. Therefore, to the
best of our knowledge, their users do not have access to this feature at the moment.
As most Encryption and Hiding add-ons are developed as a Firefox extension (with
the exception of FlyByNight), they do not have access to the privacy settings of the SNS
providers. As a result, the users have to manually manage their own Access Control Lists
(ACL) and exchange keys or XML file containing real data (in the case of FaceVPSN)
through separate channels such as email or dedicated key server. Once this initialization
is performed, the process of encryption/decryption is managed automatically by the add-
ons. As user data is encrypted and hidden from the SNS providers, these add-ons ensure
that user data only belongs to them and not to the SNS. However, because the encrypted
data is stored on a third party server, when that server is down, it is impossible to retrieve
the real data. Another limitation of the Encryption and Hiding add-ons is that they can
only encrypt text data and cannot be applied yet to other media. More precisely, NOYB
and FaceCloak can only encrypt and “hide” the information from a user profile (such
as name and birthday) while FaceVPSN shields only publicly available information in
Facebook (e.g., name, profile picture and current city).
The boundary between Encryption and Hiding add-ons and Access Control add-ons
seems to be quite fuzzy as most Access Control add-ons use encryption to provide data
sovereignty for users. There are two main categories of approaches for Access Con-
trol add-ons. In the first approach, the add-ons try to hide their existence from the SNS
providers, which is used only for friend discovery or data storage. The add-ons follow-
ing this approach are the add-ons developed by Beato, Kohlweiss and Wouters, as well
as Lockr and Persona. These add-ons manage users’ ACL locally through a Firefox ex-
tension. The contact lists are provided by an application or a plugin installed on the SNS
servers. Lockr and Persona take a step further as the encrypted data is stored on a third
party server. For instance, Lockr uses Flickr to store pictures of the users. The second
approach, which requires active cooperation from the SNS, is taken by Web-Traveler. In
this approach, the SNS is trusted with unencrypted data storage, but an access control
policy is attached to each piece of data. In this situation, the SNS can determine the
103
provenance of user data and can prevent the violation of his access control policies. The
main limit of this approach is that users rely on the good will of SNS providers.
6.4.3 Distributed SNS
Table 6.III shows the comparison between Facebook, Privacy Watch and other dis-
tributed SNS. Distributed SNS appear to solve the problem of data sovereignty inher-
ent to centralized SNS and give the users more freedom by allowing them to deploy
their own social network. These systems have participated in an attempt to defeat the
monopoly of centralized SNS represented by Facebook but currently none of the pro-
posed systems have been adopted at such a large scale.
Diaspora is the most well-known distributed SNS at the moment even though it is still
at a alpha version and users join only by invitation. To create a Diaspora account, a user
needs to build a profile from scratch or import his name, photos and posts directly from
their Facebook account. Users install their unencrypted profile on independently hosted
servers and can move their profile whenever they want. The current privacy setting
of Diaspora is limited to “per aspect" (e.g., users can specify the sharing permission
for groups of friends only). Nevertheless, all the functionalities of Diaspora are not
yet fully implemented and the hosted server provides no privacy policy at the moment.
Therefore, we think that Diaspora is not sufficiently mature for us to really assess its
privacy features.
Regarding access control, each system has different types of target users and pro-
vides different access control level. For instance, Safebook users seem to have the best
supported access control as the user data is organized in atomic attributes for which par-
ticular Access Control Policy (ACP) can be set. Friend discovery is made through a P2P
substrate in which the searchable keys are the hashed properties and node identifier of
users. Currently it seems that users cannot specify which properties are searchable or
who can search for themselves. The eXO system is designed so that its users have total
control on their contents and resources. Users can mark their content as public or pri-
vate to define which users can access. Public content items are indexed and searchable.
Additionally, owners can reject access requests made by other users, even for public con-
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tent. PeerSoN users manage their own ACL and distribute encryption keys to authorized
friends. Due to the fact that the look up service stores necessary metadata to find users
and their data, the users are not able to customize the search process. As PrPl focuses on
resource sharing services, including photo browsing and music streaming, its users can
specify a ACP on each service as well as render a service searchable or not. Vis-à-vis is
a distributed system for location sharing in which users can create groups to share their
location with fine granularity. In SuperNova, a user profile is divided into three part:
public, protected and private. Protected data is classified into different categories before
being encrypted. The decryption keys are then distributed by the users to authorized
friends. Users of Mr. Privacy system identify themselves by their email address and as
a consequence, it is quite easy to identify and search for a user in the system (unless the
email address is completely unrelated to the name of a user).
With respect to the criteria of Usability, Transparency and Accountability, we are
not able to determine to which extent the distributed systems satisfy these three criteria
at the moment. For instance, to the best of our knowledge, these systems have not yet
implemented the Privacy lens functionality. Additionally, the criteria of Explicit privacy
policy from the SNS is not applicable to distributed systems.
With respect to data sovereignty, Safebook, PeerSoN, eXo and SuperNova system
propose to use local and shared resources of the P2P overlay while PrP, Vis-a-Vis and
Mr Privacy store data on dedicated servers. In both cases, the data belong only to the
users. However, as the user data is replicated on other peer nodes or stored on third party
server, it is quite difficult to ensure in practice the right to oblivion.
In conclusion, the privacy add-ons provide simple and mostly easy-to-implement so-
lutions for users with privacy concerns. However, they cannot completely satisfy all the
privacy criteria mentioned in Section 4.4 as they still rely on the existing infrastructure
of the SNS provider and thus are limited by the functionalities of this infrastructure.
Moreover, these privacy add-ons are bound by the privacy policy and terms of use of
the SNS provider. For instance, most current SNS, such as LinkedIn, MySpace and
Facebook, claim ownership of personal information put on their SNS and do not erase
user data when users choose to delete their accounts. To summarize, current centralized
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SNS focus on interaction and sharing information between users without much concern
about their privacy. Another drawback of centralized systems is that they can be very
vulnerable to security and privacy breaches as data is stored in a centralized database,
thus making it a single point of potential failure.
The distributed SNS concept comes to the rescue by offering to users the possibil-
ity of increasing their control on the sovereignty of their data. However, these systems
suffer from the traditional disadvantages of distributed approaches such as redundant
resources and no centralized control (which in terms of privacy can of course be also
seen as an advantage). One of the main difficulties is that in a P2P network, it becomes
more difficult to search for friends and relatives unless a good look-up service is im-
plemented. Another difficulty inherited from P2P system is the question of availability.
User contents need to be replicated to other nodes to increase the availability and reduce
waiting time. Moreover, most of the proposed solutions have a high computation and
communication complexity and are only suitable for advanced users because they re-
quire some technical expertise to be effectively deployed and adopted. Therefore, casual
and normal users may possibly prefer a system offering an acceptable trade-off between
privacy and ease of use. This actually is one of the motivations behind Privacy Watch,
our own privacy-enhanced SNS. With respect to the privacy criteria defined in Section
4.4, Privacy Watch currently fulfills most of them. Our solution, Privacy Watch, is an
alternative between these two main approaches and provides a balance between privacy
and ease of use depending on the privacy level chosen by the user. One merit of Privacy
Watch is that the users do not have to install a separate server to host their profile (as it
is the case in some solutions). Moreover, the SNS provider and third parties (advertis-
ers, application providers) still get some profit from pieces of information that the users
choose to make publicly available.
In this chapter, we study multiple privacy-enhanced solutions for SNS and compare
them with our own solution Privacy Watch according to the privacy criteria described in
Section 4.4. The conclusion will be presented in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION
Since their introduction, Social Networking Sites (SNS) such as MySpace, Face-
book, Hi5 and LinkedIn have attracted millions of users and have become established
places for keeping contact with old acquaintances and meeting new ones. Because of
the numerous interactions between users, large amounts of personal information circu-
late on the SNS. However, due to lacks of user awareness and proper privacy protection
tools, huge quantities of user data, including personal information, pictures and videos
are quickly falling into the hands of authorities, strangers, recruiters, and even the pub-
lic at large. Privacy settings of the current SNS are not flexible enough to protect user
data. In addition, users have no control on what others reveal about them. Many third
party applications and marketers can take advantage of the users’ personal information
without their knowledge or agreement. By using SNS and accepting their privacy policy,
the user has volunteered to relinquish their ownership on their own data. That’s why the
proposed solutions based on current SNS cannot solve all user privacy issues.
In September 2008, a special issue of the Scientific American has raised the question
about the future of privacy in a Facebook age: “Can we safeguard our information in a
high-tech and insecure world?” To answer this question, in this thesis, we present an ap-
proach that both increases privacy awareness of the users and maintains the sovereignty
of their data when using SNS.
The first contribution of this thesis is the classification of multiple types of risks as
well as user expectations regarding privacy in SNS (see chapter 3). Specifically, we
first identify three main privacy risks in SNS: security, reputation and credibility, and
profiling risks. Secondly, we conduct a preliminary study on privacy issues in SNS.
Even though the survey might not cover the whole spectrum of SNS users, it confirms
the existence of these three privacy risks and highlight different privacy requirements
and privacy concerns among SNS users.
To address these privacy concerns, afterwards, we introduce the Privacy Framework
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for SNS and the concept of User Privacy Policy (UPP) (see chapter 4). Specifically,
since privacy revolves around user data, we categorize user data, user privacy concerns
as well as groups of trust. Based on these categorizations, we derive four privacy levels
(No Privacy, Soft Privacy, Hard Privacy, Full Privacy) and three tracking levels (Strong
Tracking, Weak Tracking and No Tracking). Through the use of UPP, the data owners
can demand anyone who will access their data to abide by their condition, such as no
disclosure to other parties.
While SNS and privacy may seem a priori to have two opposite goals, the fact that
most of the current SNS do not respect the data minimization and the data sovereignty
principles is not because it is impossible but rather is a design choice made by the SNS
providers. Therefore in order to reconcile SNS and privacy, the third contribution of
the thesis is a taxonomy of different privacy criteria that an SNS can integrate into its
design to enhance the privacy of its users (see Section 4.4). Moreover, we are also the
first to coin the term of a Privacy-enhanced Social Networking Site (PSNS). An PSNS is
a social networking site fulfilling the properties of privacy awareness and customization,
data minimization and data sovereignty.
Furthermore, we present also Privacy Watch, a theoretical proposal of a PSNS plat-
form that combines the concept of provenance and accountability to help SNS users
maintain sovereignty over their personal data (see chapter 5). One important contribu-
tion of Privacy Watch is that it could partially enforce the privacy policies (UPP) stated
by the different actors of the SNS (such as SNS provider, applications and other users).
Indeed it is very easy for an actor to state a particular privacy policy, but in reality
nothing really forces him to respect it once he has been able to access this piece of infor-
mation. For instance, a user might do a copy of a particular sensitive picture of a friend
without his consent. However, by combining watermarking methods with accountability
mechanism, the users of Privacy Watch can review and partially control how their per-
sonal information flows both inside (through the Access Controller) and outside the SNS
(through the Personal Tracker).
Finally, we study the different solutions that have been proposed to enhance the pri-
vacy of users of SNS and evaluate these solutions according to the privacy criteria de-
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fined in Section 4.4. Compared with these solutions, the most important advantage of
Privacy Watch is that it provides a balance between privacy and ease of use depend-
ing on the privacy level chosen by the user (see chapter 6). Moreover, the users do not
have to install a separate server to host their profile (as it is the case in some solutions).
Moreover, the SNS provider and third parties (advertisers, application providers) still
get some profit from pieces of information that the users choose to make publicly avail-
able. Additionally, as Privacy Watch is built as a generic PSNS platform, existing SNS
can be modified to follow the architecture of Privacy Watch, albeit with significant code
modification. However, this choice is entirely depended on SNS providers.
Privacy Watch currently fulfils most of the required privacy criteria for SNS except
for a few that we plan to implement as future work, for instance the report spam/abuse
mechanism and the reputation system. The role of the reputation system is to help the
user determine to what extent he can trust a potential friend. With the reputation sys-
tem, the user will be kept well informed about how many times a potential ‘friend’ has
violated the UPP and how others view and trust this ‘friend’.
Another shortcoming of Privacy Watch is that the watermarking methods currently
only work with pictures, whereas a large amount of user data on SNS is in a text format.
In future work, we intend to tackle the problem of maintaining sovereignty on text data
in SNS.
In particular, it would be illusory to hope for an SNS in which no privacy breach can
occur because online “friends” can never be fully trusted. Indeed, a so-called “friend”
of a user can always save a picture he has accessed to inside the SNS and then post that
picture on an external website outside the boundaries of the system. However, with the
accountability information and the UPP integrated inside that picture, it is possible to
detect and to trace the origin of a privacy breach once it has occurred. Thus, the SNS
users are able to claim back their privacy by asking the responsible person to erase this
data or by providing evidences to a third party such as the SNS provider or a judge. We
believe that individuals would be less inclined to cause a privacy breach, if they know
that they might possibly be accountable for it in the future.
Another important issue to consider is the credibility of evidence produced by this
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system in case of litigation. Indeed as cybercrime and data protection regulations dif-
fer from country to country, it is a complex task to make the UPP a binding contract
and to incorporate all the required data. For instance, after posting a picture of herself
“drunken” because of grape juice to share with friends as a joke, Alice may discover at a
later date that the picture was used in an advertising campaign against alcohol. Based on
the provenance data embedded in the photo Alice could in principle find out that Carol,
one of her friends, was the one responsible for disclosing her picture without respecting
Alice’s privacy requirements. One important question is whether or not this provenance
data would be sufficient to convince a judge that Carol violated Alice’s UPP and to be-
gin working through an appropriate means of remediation. Overall, privacy comes at a
price. However, that price is acceptable as it provides user better protection against the
underlying risks in social networking activities.
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